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1457 
Creating Crimmigration 
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández* 
The story of the United States has been one of welcoming 
foreigners. It has also been a story of excluding foreigners.1 Some 
prospective immigrants have been deemed worthy of admission into 
the country, while others have been turned back.2 Some entered 
without asking the government’s permission and were deported after 
coming to the federal government’s attention,3 while others were 
given reprieve.4 Still others have been allowed permission to enter 
only to have that permission rescinded.5 The bases of inclusion and 
exclusion have shifted over time, but they have always turned on 
markers of desirability or undesirability.6 
 
* Visiting Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Associate Professor, 
Capital University Law School; Publisher, crImmigration.com. Many thanks to Ernesto 
Hernandez-Lopez and Margaret B. Kwoka whose comments on earlier drafts greatly improved 
this article. 
 1. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND 
CIVIL RIGHTS 2 (2004) [hereinafter JOHNSON, HUDDLED MASSES]. 
 2. See generally Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 203(a)–(c), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1153(a)–(c) (2012) [hereinafter INA] (explaining the categories of noncitizens who may be 
admitted as lawful permanent residents); § 204(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (detailing the process 
for admitting noncitizens as lawful permanent residents); § 214(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1184 
(authorizing admission of noncitizens as nonimmigrant visitors); § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) 
(providing grounds of inadmissibility). 
 3. See generally INA § 237(a)(1)(A), (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A), (B) (providing 
grounds of deportation for noncitizens who were inadmissible at the time of entry or are 
presently in violation of immigration law). 
 4. See State and Local Regulation of Unauthorized Immigrant Employment, 
Developments in the Law: Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1565, 1613 (2013) (explaining that “[a]lmost 3 million undocumented immigrants received 
lawful permanent resident status through IRCA’s amnesty program”); see also INA § 245(i), 8 
U.S.C. § 1255(i) (authorizing adjustment of status for certain noncitizens who entered 
without inspection). 
 5. See generally INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (authorizing deportation of any 
noncitizen who was admitted into the United States and then violated the conditions of their 
stay through one of many enumerated actions). 
 6. See Pooja Gehi, Struggles from the Margins: Anti-Immigrant Legislation and the 
Impact on Low-Income Transgender People of Color, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 315, 316–17 
(2009) (explaining that immigration law in the United States has been constructed “as a way 
to keep in desirables and keep out undesirables,” then listing multiple categories of people who 
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Beginning in the 1980s, however, the dominant distinguishing 
characteristic between prospective immigrants who have been 
welcomed and those who have been shunned has turned on criminal 
activity. Convictions for a growing list of offenses result in removal—
the technical umbrella term for exclusion and deportation.7 
Sometimes commission—rather than conviction—of such an offense 
is sufficient.8 At the same time, immigration law enforcement has 
increasingly adopted the securitized approach of criminal law 
enforcement.9 And criminal investigations involving certain crimes 
related to immigration activity have borrowed many of the more lax 
procedures traditionally used in the civil immigration law system.10 
These are the emblems of crimmigration law.11 Together they 
abandon framing noncitizens as contributing members of society on 
the path to full political membership as citizens—“Americans in 
waiting,” as Hiroshi Motomura termed the experience of earlier 
generations of immigrants to the United States.12 Instead, the 
procedural and substantive law that comprises crimmigration law has 
reimagined noncitizens as criminal deviants and security risks.13 They 
are people to be feared,14 their risk assessed,15 and the threat they 
 
have been negatively impacted by immigration law); Mary Holper, Deportation for a Sin: Why 
Moral Turpitude is Void for Vagueness, 90 NEB. L. REV. 647, 650 (2012) (quoting DANIEL 
KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION 115 (2007) (explaining that a congressional panel in 
1891 “recommended new immigration laws to ‘separate the desirable from the undesirable 
immigrants’”)); Gerald L. Neuman, Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the Rule 
of Law, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1335, 1335 (2008) (noting that in the aftermath of the Civil 
War, Congress enacted legislation to exclude immigrants considered “undesirable”); see also 
Eric A. Posner, The Institutional Structure of Immigration Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 295 
(2013) (noting that “immigration law . . . can be understood . . . as a screening device for 
distinguishing desirable migrants and undesirable migrants”). 
 7. See INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2); INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2). “Removal” proceedings encompass deportation and inadmissibility. INA 
§ 240(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a). 
 8. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 9. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 10. See infra Part II.C–D. 
 11. See Juliet P. Stumpf, Introduction to SOCIAL CONTROL AND JUSTICE: 
CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF FEAR 7, 7 (Maria João Guia et al. eds., 2013). 
 12. See generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 132 (2006). 
 13. See Stumpf, supra note 11, at 10. 
 14. See id. at 11. 
 15. See Robert Koulish, Entering the Risk Society: A Contested Terrain for Immigration 
 
DO NOT DELETE 1/27/2014 11:03 AM 
1457 Creating Crimmigration 
 1459 
pose managed.16 Crime control and migration control have become 
so intertwined that they have ceased to be distinct processes or to 
target distinct acts, for both noncitizens and individuals suspected of 
being noncitizens.17 
Scholars from a variety of disciplines have recently begun to 
identify crimmigration law’s core features and map its contours.18 
None, however, have attempted to discern why crimmigration law 
developed when it did. Animosity toward noncitizens has been a 
feature of the United States’ conflicted view of newcomers since long 
before the colonies split from Britain.19 Why, then, did 
crimmigration law not develop earlier? This Article sets out to answer 
that question. 
Crimmigration law, this Article explains, developed in the closing 
decades of the twentieth century due to a shift in the perception of 
criminal law’s proper place in society combined with a reinvigorated 
fear of noncitizens that occurred in the aftermath of the civil rights 
movement. Specifically, in the aftermath of the civil rights 
movement, overt racism became culturally disdained and facially 
racist laws impermissible. Derision of people of color, however, did 
not cease. Instead, it found a new outlet in facially neutral rhetoric 
and laws penalizing criminal activity. When immigration became a 
national political concern for the first time since the civil rights era, 
policymakers turned to criminal law and procedure to do what race 
had done in earlier generations: sort the desirable newcomers from 
the undesirable. 
 
 
Enforcement, in SOCIAL CONTROL AND JUSTICE: CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF FEAR, 
supra note 11, at 61, 83. 
 16. See id.; see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 137 (2009) (“In recent years . . . the U.S. government has 
increasingly handled migration control through the criminal justice system.”). 
 17. See Joanne van der Leun & Maartje van der Woude, A Reflection on Crimmigration 
in the Netherlands: On the Cultural Security Complex and the Impact of Framing, in SOCIAL 
CONTROL AND JUSTICE: CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF FEAR, supra note 11, at 41, 43. 
 18. See generally SOCIAL CONTROL AND JUSTICE: CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF 
FEAR, supra note 11 (presenting scholarly work on crimmigration from a variety of disciplines). 
 19. See generally KANSTROOM, supra note 6, at 21–90 (describing various forms of 
exclusion and deportation during the colonial era); see also ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT 
JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS 9 (1985) (discussing nativism 
during the founding era). 
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To unravel this proposition, this Article proceeds in three parts. 
Part I reviews the long historical derision of noncitizens, which 
indicates that immigrants have been subjected to stigma, 
discrimination, and violence throughout the nation’s history. Yet it 
was only at the end of the twentieth century that immigration law 
became so enmeshed with criminal law that the “penalty of 
deportation” became “‘most difficult’ to divorce . . . from the 
conviction,” as the Supreme Court concluded in 2010.20 What 
changed, Part II explains, is the willingness with which United States 
law and society turned to penal norms to address social phenomena 
deemed problematic. The “war on crime” and, in particular, its 
sharp-edged progeny, the “war on drugs,” created the societal 
perception that crime lurks everywhere. In response, police officers 
became an omnipresent feature of community life, especially in 
urban areas. Concomitantly, imprisonment became a characteristic of 
late twentieth century United States law, culture, and social 
organization. Legislators at the federal, state, and local level enacted 
innumerable statutes expanding the scope of confinement. As a 
result, the United States experienced an imprisonment boom unlike 
any seen in its history. Jail and prison populations skyrocketed; so 
too did the number of people under other types of correctional 
supervision, such as probation and parole. For many people, 
encounters with the police and imprisonment became expected—
almost inevitable—stages of life. 
Criminal law and procedure trends in the 1980s might have 
remained largely irrelevant to noncitizens had it not been for a 
simultaneously reignited concern about immigration that developed in 
the 1970s and 1980s. As Part III explains, unauthorized immigration 
began to grow steadily after passage of the Hart-Celler Act of 1965, 
which imposed a cap on the number of visas available per country, 
including even countries with deep ties to the United States.21 Almost 
from the beginning, demand for visas from Mexican citizens greatly 
exceeded supply. Within a few years, the large numbers of Haitians, 
Cubans, and Central Americans who flocked to the United States 
compounded the concern about the federal government’s regulation of 
 
 20. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010). 
 21. Immigration Act of 1965 (Hart-Celler Act), Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2, 79 Stat. 911, 911. 
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immigration. By the mid-1980s, immigration reentered the political 
arena where prominent policymakers associated the new round of arriving 
noncitizens, racialized as not white, with lawbreaking that endangered the 
nation’s security. 
Unlike earlier episodes of widespread concern about 
immigration, legislators operating in the aftermath of the previous 
decades’ civil rights movements could not resort to the simple 
vilifications that motivated so much of immigration law’s history. 
Instead, as Part IV illustrates, the national government began to turn 
to the criminal policing practices that had taken hold at the state and 
federal levels with devastating consequences for people of color—in 
particular a reduction in judicial discretion and a newfound 
willingness to tap its authority to imprison. Though Congress and 
President Reagan famously enacted a broad amnesty provision 
regularizing the status of millions of people already present in the 
United States,22 the federal government also began its long march 
toward interweaving criminal law and immigration law. It began, in 
other words, to create crimmigration law. 
I. A HISTORY OF ANIMUS 
Animus towards immigrants has long run through the United 
States’ cultural and political institutions.23 Although both cultural 
animus and legal sanctions have often focused on particular ethnic 
groups, immigrants with criminal histories have long been targeted 
for especially harsh treatment. Nonetheless, history demonstrates 
that animus towards immigrants in general, and immigrants with 
criminal records in particular, was alone insufficient to cause 
immigration, criminal laws, and law enforcement to comingle in 
pursuit of common goals. Rather, the crimmigration regime is a 
recent phenomenon. 
Ethnicity-based animus long pre-dates the country’s founding. 
Benjamin Franklin famously asked why Germans should “‘be 
suffered to swarm into our Settlements, and by herding together 
establish their Language and Manners to the Exclusion of ours. Why 
 
 22. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, §§ 201–03, 
100 Stat. 3359, 3394, 3405. 
 23. See JUAN F. PEREA, Introduction to IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW NATIVISM AND 
THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 1–2 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997). 
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should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a Colony of 
Aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us, instead 
of our Anglifying them [sic].’”24 Franklin, of course, was not alone 
among the members of his generation in his antipathy towards 
foreigners. The “first major deportation of European settlers in the 
New World,” writes Daniel Kanstroom, began in 1755 when officials 
in Nova Scotia loyal to the British drove French colonists known as 
Acadians out of the territory and ordered their buildings burned.25 
Distaste for newcomers based on ethnicity, of course, did not 
subside with time. Rather, foreigners have been derided in almost 
every period of the nation’s history.26 The Chinese were explicitly 
excluded by statute in 1882, while in 1907 Henry James described a 
“swarming . . . Jewry that had burst all bounds” in New York.27 
Italians were later described as similar to Chinese or, more 
commonly, to blacks—neither comparison meant as flattery—and 
subjected to an array of discrimination.28 Years later, Mexicans, 
including United States citizens of Mexican descent, were welcomed 
as temporary laborers during a labor shortage, only to experience 
mass deportation when they were no longer wanted.29 
The anti-immigrant strain that stretches across the nation’s 
history is not solely focused on immigrants’ ethnicity. Instead, there 
is also a long tradition of directing special antagonism toward 
foreigners who violate criminal laws either domestically or abroad. 
For instance, in the 1750s, Franklin lodged special opprobrium 
against convicts sent to the colonies’ shores by European nations, a 
common alternative to a death sentence for hundreds of crimes:30 
“‘In what can Britain show a more Sovereign Contempt for us, than 
by emptying their Jails into our Settlements; unless they would 
 
 24. John B. Frantz, Franklin and the Pennsylvania Germans, 65 PA. HIST. J. MID-
ATLANTIC STUD. 21, 23 (1998) (citing THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 234 (Leonard 
W. Labaree et al. eds., 1969)). 
 25. KANSTROOM, supra note 6, at 44. 
 26. See HULL, supra note 19, at 9; JOHNSON, HUDDLED MASSES, supra note 1, at 7. 
 27. HENRY JAMES, THE AMERICAN SCENE 127 (1907). 
 28. DAVID R. ROEDIGER, WORKING TOWARD WHITENESS: HOW AMERICA’S 
IMMIGRANTS BECAME WHITE 46–47 (2005). 
 29. IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 27–28 
(2006). 
 30. See KANSTROOM, supra note 6, at 39–41. 
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likewise empty their Jakes [privies] on our Tables?’”31 Convicted 
foreigners, Franklin thought, were little better than feces. A 
resolution enacted by the Continental Congress some thirty years 
later suggests that the prevailing opinion had not changed. In 1788, 
the Continental Congress “unanimously adopted a resolution, 
recommending to the several states to pass proper laws for 
preventing the transportation of convicted malefactors from foreign 
countries into the United States.”32 By 1791, at least six states had 
done so.33 Eventually Britain turned its attention to Australia as a 
destination for its convicts, but rumors persisted as late as 1874 that 
Britain continued its old practice of sending lawbreakers to the 
United States.34 
During the late nineteenth century, Congress began enacting 
legislation that excluded individuals who had been convicted of 
specified types of crimes from entering the United States. In 1875, 
the federal government’s first modern foray into regulating 
immigration—the same act that launched the now-dominant view 
that immigration regulation is the exclusive province of the federal 
government—included a prohibition against the entry of convicted 
felons.35 The infamous Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 criminalized 
helping Chinese enter without authorization and fraudulently 
obtaining the certificates of residence required for Chinese to live 
here.36 Less than a decade later, in 1891, Congress enacted a 
provision that remains a central part of immigration law today and is 
a constant source of headaches for immigration attorneys—the basis 
of exclusion for having committed a crime involving moral 
 
 31. DAVID WALDSTREICHER, RUNAWAY AMERICA: BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, SLAVERY, 
AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 140 (2004). The Virginia Gazette displayed similar 
sentiments in a 1751 article: “When we see our Papers fill’d continually with accounts of the 
most audacious Robberies, the most Cruel Murders, and infinite other Villanies perpetrated by 
Convicts transported from Europe, what melancholy, what terrible Reflections must it 
occasion!” KANSTROOM, supra note 6, at 41. 
 32. New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 112 (1837). 
 33. Id. at 112–13. 
 34. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law, (1776–1875), 
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1842, 1842 n.41 (1993). 
 35. Act of March 3, 1875 (Page Act), ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477. 
 36. Act of May 6, 1882 (Chinese Exclusion Act), ch. 126, §§ 7, 11, 22 Stat. 58, 60–61, 
repealed by Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act of 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600. 
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turpitude.37 That same public law authorized the deportation of 
anyone who entered the country in violation of immigration law—
but, importantly, limited this authority to the year after the 
noncitizen’s arrival in the United States—creating what Kanstroom 
refers to as the “first general deportation law since the Alien and 
Sedition Acts” of 1798.38 It was not until the Immigration Act of 
1917 was enacted, however, that commission of a crime involving 
moral turpitude would explicitly become a basis for deportation.39 
Five years later, Congress added narcotics offenses to the list of 
reasons justifying deportation.40 
As criminal histories became an increasingly common method of 
distinguishing between excludable and admissible noncitizens, 
criminal law also began to be used as a method of regulating 
immigration. Aside from banning entry of most Chinese citizens and 
descendants, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1892 imposed a year of 
hard labor on any Chinese person found to be unlawfully present in 
the United States.41 No judicial process was required before 
imprisonment; a determination by an immigration official, an officer 
of the Executive Branch, sufficed.42 However, four years later the 
Supreme Court in Wong Wing v. United States concluded that 
Congress, in enacting this provision, overstepped its authority. While 
Congress could ban the Chinese, the Court explained, it could not 
turn to criminal punishments without “provid[ing] for a judicial trial 
to establish the guilt of the accused.”43 Importantly, Wong Wing 
recognized the government’s power to impose criminal penalties so 
long as it abided by constitutional limitations on its power to 
criminalize. “[W]e think it would be plainly competent for 
 
 37. See Immigration Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084. 
 38. KANSTROOM, supra note 6, at 115. 
 39. Holper, supra note 6, at 650. The 1917 Act authorized deportation for having 
committed a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of entry into the United States if 
the sentence received was for a year or more, or for having committed two crimes involving 
moral turpitude at any time after entry. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, §§ 3, 19, 39 Stat. 874. 
 40. Act of May 26, 1922, ch. 202, Pub. L. No. 227, 42 Stat. 596; see Matter of V-----, 
1 I. & N. Dec. 293, 295 (Bd. Immgr. .Appeals 1942) (holding that such a conviction could 
also serve as a basis for exclusion). 
 41. Geary Act of 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25; see BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND 
REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 1850–1990, 23–24 (1993). 
 42. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235–36 (1896). 
 43. Id. at 237. 
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[C]ongress to declare the act of an alien in remaining unlawfully 
within the United States to be an offense punishable by fine or 
imprisonment,” it explained, “if such offense were to be established 
by a judicial trial.”44 Thirty-three years later Congress exploited that 
statement when, in 1929, it criminalized unauthorized entry into the 
United States with a penalty of up to a year imprisonment and a 
maximum fine of $1,000.45 This same Act imposed a maximum of 
two years imprisonment, a federal felony, on people who entered 
without authorization after having been previously deported.46 
Despite the development of a legislative scheme that relied on 
interactions with the criminal justice system and a parallel body of 
substantive criminal offenses punishing forms of immigration, 
criminal law and immigration law largely remained distinct bodies of 
law through the early 1980s. To begin, none of these punitive 
legislative authorizations were utilized all that much. The bulk of 
people who were excluded or deported suffered that fate because 
they lacked permission to be in the United States.47 Perhaps they 
entered without permission, or perhaps they violated some condition 
of their authorization. In all but a small number of situations, the 
principal motivating factor for their removal was not involvement in 
criminal activity.48 Likewise, the immigration-related federal crimes 
did not play a prominent role in the lives of most noncitizens or the 
immigration law enforcement agendas of most presidential  
 
 
 44. Id. at 235. 
 45. Act of March 4, 1929, ch. 690, § 2, 45 Stat. 1551, 1551. 
 46. Id. § 1. 
 47. According to the statistical data published by the INS, 633,918 people were 
excluded from the United States between 1892 and 1984. U.S. IMMIGRATION & 
NATURALIZATION SERV., 1996 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 175 tbl.60 (1997) [hereinafter INS 1996 YEARBOOK]. Of these, 
192,545 were excluded because they lacked the proper documents, and 219,421 because they 
were deemed likely to become a public charge. Id. Similarly, 812,915 people were deported 
between 1908 and 1980. Id. at 183 tbl.65. Of these, 334,889 were deported because they 
entered without inspection or by relying on false statements; 154,896 due to having entered 
without the proper documents; and another 124,465 because they failed to comply with the 
conditions of their authorized presence. Id. 
 48. Of the 633,918 people excluded from the United States between 1892 and 1984, 
only 14,287 were excluded due to a criminal or narcotics violation. Id. at 175 tbl.60. Similarly, 
of the 812,915 people deported between 1908 and 1980, only 48,330 were deported due to a 
criminal violation and another 8,339 for a narcotics violation. Id. at 183 tbl.65. 
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administrations. Neither illegal entry nor illegal reentry was 
prosecuted frequently.49 
Furthermore, criminal policing norms and immigration law 
enforcement norms remained distinct. Use of firearms and large-scale 
reliance on detention, for example, were largely unheard of in the 
immigration law enforcement context. Employees of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), the federal 
government agency charged with enforcing immigration laws for 
much of the twentieth century, were not even authorized to carry 
firearms until 1990.50 Detention pending a decision about whether a 
person could remain in the United States was unquestionably the 
exception.51 For most of the twentieth century, few noncitizens 
subjected to immigration proceedings saw the inside of an 
immigration detention center. Indeed, the INS lacked the capacity to 
detain large numbers of noncitizens even if it wanted to do so. 
For all the hostility toward noncitizens that has appeared 
throughout United States’ history, the immigration law apparatus 
remained distinct from the penal system. Criminal law maintained a 
focus on the traditional conduct associated with criminality—offenses 
against property and people. Immigration law, meanwhile, remained 
firmly encamped within civil law, sorting through the administrative 
matter of who was authorized to be in the country. People suspected 
of violating immigration law were accordingly processed through the 
civil immigration court system, an administrative unit first of the 
Department of Labor, then the Department of Justice. Within this 
system, they were not entitled to appointed counsel, as the Sixth 
Amendment requires in criminal prosecutions, and though they were 
protected by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, it is a due  
 
 
 49. As late as 1993, federal prosecutors lodged only 2,487 criminal cases where the lead 
charge was an immigration offense. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUS. 
1997 ANNUAL REPORT 188 tbl.D-2 [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUS. 1997 REPORT]. 
 50. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 503, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048–49. 
 51. In 1954, the INS abandoned its policy of detaining immigrants “except in rare cases 
where an alien was considered likely to ‘abscond’ or to pose a danger to the nation or 
community.” MARK DOW, AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS 6–7 
(2004). The agency’s detention statistics indicate that few people were categorized as such: the 
INS detained only 2370 people, on average, in 1973. Id. at 8. That figure increased to 4062 
by 1980, though the INS thought of this as too low given its newly created plans to detain 
hundreds of thousands of suspected unauthorized noncitizens. Id. 
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process regime mitigated by Congress and the President’s power to 
dictate admission and the conditions of a noncitizen’s stay.52 
II. IDENTIFYING CRIMMIGRATION 
The convergence of criminal and immigration law was therefore 
neither obvious nor necessary. Beginning in the 1980s and blooming 
in the 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century, criminal 
law and immigration law lost much of their separate identities. In 
many respects, wrote Juliet Stumpf in her foundational article 
examining crimmigration law, the criminalization of immigration law 
“has created parallel systems in which immigration law and the 
criminal justice system are merely nominally separate.”53 This, she 
added, has meant that “aliens [have] become synonymous with 
criminals.”54 Examining federal initiatives designed to process vast 
numbers of immigration-related criminal prosecutions of 
noncitizens, Jennifer Chacón similarly argues that “we are also 
witnessing the importation of the relaxed procedural norms of civil 
immigration proceedings into the criminal realm.”55 
As Stumpf’s and Chacón’s descriptions suggest, crimmigration 
might be defined as “the intertwinement of crime control and 
migration control.”56 Starting in the 1980s, this “intertwinement” has 
rapidly expanded in the United States and changed the procedure and 
substance of criminal and immigration law such that as a person 
becomes entangled in one, she suffers increasingly adverse 
consequences in the other. First, involvement in criminal activity now 
frequently leads to “presumptively mandatory” removal, as the 
Supreme Court recognized in Padilla v. Kentucky.57 Second, the 
 
 52. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) 
(“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied 
entry is concerned.”); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903) (extending Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause protections to deportation proceedings); Peter L. Markowitz, 
Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1302 (2011) (“[A]s a result of the civil 
label currently applied to deportation proceedings, poor immigrants have no right to 
appointed counsel despite the notorious complexity of immigration law . . . .”). 
 53. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 
56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006). 
 54. Id. at 419. 
 55. Chacón, supra note 16, at 137. 
 56. Van der Leun & Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 41, 43. 
 57. 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010). 
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federal government and its subfederal counterparts have taken to 
punishing immigration-related activities through their respective penal 
systems. These developments have been made possible because the 
procedural laxity of civil immigration proceedings now appears in 
criminal proceedings involving immigration activity. Meanwhile, the 
policing norms of the criminal justice system have become emblematic 
of modern immigration policing, while trends long visible in 
immigration law policing have begun to appear in traditional criminal 
policing. 
A. Expanding Crime-Based Removal 
During the 1980s and 1990s, Congress, with the support of 
multiple presidential administrations, drastically increased the types 
of criminal conduct that could result in removal. In addition to the 
decades-old penalty available for conviction of a crime involving 
moral turpitude, Congress expanded the narcotics conviction basis of 
deportation to include any controlled-substances offense, whether 
enacted by a state, the federal government, or a foreign country.58 
Moreover, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 added the “aggravated 
felony” into the immigration law lexicon and provided that a 
conviction for an aggravated felony would result in deportation.59 At 
the time, only three crimes were considered aggravated felonies: 
murder, illicit trafficking in firearms, and drug trafficking.60 Two 
years later, the Immigration Act of 1990 expanded the definition of 
“aggravated felony” by adding money laundering and crimes of 
violence, for which a term of imprisonment of at least five years was 
imposed.61 In a separate provision, the 1990 Act authorized 
deportation for attempting to violate a controlled-substances 
 
 58. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1751, 100 Stat. 3207 
(amending INA § 212(a)(23), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23) (2012)) (replacing the provision 
authorizing deportation on the basis of a conviction for an “‘addiction-sustaining opiate’” with 
a provision referencing any conviction involving a controlled substance under a state, federal, 
or foreign country’s law); see INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Controlled-
substances offenses and crimes involving moral turpitude can also result in exclusion from the 
United States. Id. § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II). 
 59. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 
4469–70 (amending INA § 101(a), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048. 
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offense.62 Two well-known public laws enacted in 1996, the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 
added a host of offenses to the aggravated felony definition. AEDPA 
added offenses such as gambling, transportation related to 
prostitution, human smuggling, certain passport fraud convictions, 
perjury, failure to appear for a judicial proceeding, and more.63 Five 
months later, IIRIRA added the offenses of rape and sexual abuse of 
a minor, reduced the money-laundering threshold from $100,000 to 
$10,000, and lowered the fraud and tax evasion amount from 
$200,000 to $10,000, among other changes.64 IIRIRA also 
authorized the federal government to remove a person convicted of 
an aggravated felony and sentenced to at least five years 
imprisonment, even to a country where her “life or freedom would 
be threatened . . . because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”65 
Today, the aggravated felony definition spans twenty-one 
subsections, some of which include their own subsections.66 
Options for relief from removal are few (and diminishing over 
time) and eligibility is limited. In 1990, Congress repealed the 
judicial recommendation against deportation, a statutory power that 
criminal sentencing judges had wielded for almost a half century to 
prevent deportation on the basis of a particular conviction.67 That 
same year, legislators began to narrow the eligibility criteria for an 
even older form of relief from removal that immigration judges had 
at their disposal—relief under former § 212(c) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (“INA”).68 Six years later Congress repealed 
 
 62. Id. § 508. 
 63. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
§ 440, 110 Stat. 1214, 1276–77. 
 64. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–627 (amending INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)). 
 65. Id. § 305 (amending INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251). 
 66. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)–(U). 
 67. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050. 
 68. Id. § 511; see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 294–97 (2001) (“In 1990, Congress 
amended § 212(c) to preclude from discretionary relief anyone convicted of an aggravated 
felony who had served a term of imprisonment of at least five years.”). 
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§ 212(c) altogether.69 In its place, it enacted cancellation of 
removal.70 Though cancellation of removal is the most charitable 
form of relief from removal that exists in the current version of the 
INA, the eligibility criteria are significantly narrower than they were 
under § 212(c). Meanwhile, in 1994, criminal court judges received 
the power to order deportation as part of the sentencing process.71 
Immigration officials were quick to tap their emerging powers to 
target convicted noncitizens. As a point of comparison, in the decade 
from 1971 to 1980, the INS deported 6150 people because of a 
criminal or narcotics violation.72 Though the numbers began to 
increase, the pattern did not change significantly for the next several 
years.73 In 1986, when crimmigration law was only starting to 
blossom, the INS reported removing 1978 people “for criminal and 
narcotics violations,” a mere 4% of the total number removed that 
year.74 Two years later, it removed 5956 people for these reasons, a 
significant 23.1% of the total number of people removed that year.75 
By 1992, it reported removing 24,219 people (55.6%), and in 1996, 
it reported removing 36,909 (53.8%) for criminal or drug 
violations.76 
For most noncitizens convicted of one of these offenses, 
entering the U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement’s 
(“ICE”) radar is likely to result in removal. According to an 
analysis by Hiroshi Motomura, for example, of the roughly 
600,000 deportable noncitizens arrested by ICE or the U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) agency—the two 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) units primarily 
responsible for enforcing immigration law—in fiscal year 2009, 
somewhere between 400,000 and 600,000 were prosecuted, 
 
 69. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, § 304(b) (repealing 
INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
416, § 224(a), 108 Stat. 4305, 4322 (amending INA § 242A, 8 U.S.C. § 1252a) (recodified 
at INA § 238(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(a)). 
 72. INS 1996 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at 183 tbl.65 (1997). 
 73. Id. at 183 tbl.66. 
 74. Id. at 170–71. 
 75. Id. at 171. 
 76. Id. 
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adjudicated, and ordered to depart the United States.77 Once a 
noncitizen who has violated immigration law comes into the 
hands of an immigration officer the likelihood of being allowed to 
remain in the country is slim.78 
B. Criminalizing Migration 
While Congress was busy expanding the range of crimes that 
could result in removal, it also became more willing to use 
traditional criminal law to punish immigration law violations. In the 
1980s and 1990s, Congress enacted a spate of new immigration-
related crimes and increased the penalties for existing crimes. When 
it added the “aggravated felony” category of removable offense to 
immigration law in 1988, for example, it raised the maximum term 
of imprisonment to fifteen years if a noncitizen who entered the 
United States without authorization had previously been convicted 
of an aggravated felony.79 Later, the maximum was again raised; 
this time to twenty years imprisonment, where it remains today.80 
Also during the 1980s, the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986, best known for its amnesty provisions, criminalized certain 
immigration conduct and stiffened penalties for existing 
immigration crimes. One section, for example, criminalized hiring 
unauthorized workers, with the possibility of six months 
imprisonment.81 Another section authorized up to five years 
imprisonment for bringing people into the United States 
clandestinely,82 while a third provision enhanced the penalty for 
possession or use of a false immigration document.83 Four days 
later, the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments Act 
 
 77. Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, 
State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1841 fig.2 
(2011). 
 78. See id. at 1836 (“[T]he arrest stage has been when government officers . . . exercise 
the discretion that matters.”); id. at 1842 (“[T]he immigration enforcement discretion 
exercised at the arrest stage has been the discretion that matters.”). 
 79. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7345, 102 Stat. 4181, 
4469–70. 
 80. INA § 276(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (2012). 
 81. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101, 100 
Stat. 3359, 3360 (codified at INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a). 
 82. Id. § 112 (amending INA § 274(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1324). 
 83. Id. § 103 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1546). 
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criminalized “knowingly enter[ing] into a marriage for the purpose 
of evading any provision of the immigration laws,” and imposed a 
maximum of five years imprisonment.84 A decade later, Congress 
added a criminal penalty of as much as five years for failure to 
disclose having falsely prepared an application for immigration 
benefits and added a repeat offender provision that could raise the 
penalty to fifteen years.85 
With time, immigration offenses began to fill a larger portion of 
the federal criminal docket. In 1993, for example, 2487 federal 
criminal prosecutions were filed in which an immigration crime was 
the lead charge, making these cases 5.4% of the nation’s criminal 
docket.86 By 1997, the 6677 immigration law prosecutions made up 
13.4% of the federal criminal docket.87 In 2001, the first year for 
which the federal courts reported the number of prosecutions for 
illegal entry and illegal reentry, immigration offenses constituted 
18.2% of the docket.88 Illegal entry and illegal reentry prosecutions 
alone made up 14.9% of all criminal cases initiated by federal 
prosecutors that year.89 
This steady expansion sped up during the administration of 
President George W. Bush, and it continues under President Obama. 
In January 2013 alone, 7557 defendants were charged with illegal 
entry before federal magistrates and another 1557 with illegal reentry 
before district court judges.90 More telling is the jump in illegal entry 
and illegal reentry prosecutions that occurred in 2008 and has yet to 
subside. In 2007, federal prosecutors filed 31,639 criminal cases in 
 
 84. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 2(d), 
100 Stat. 3537, 3542. 
 85. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 213, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-571 (codified at INA § 274C(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e) (2012)). 
 86. See JUDICIAL BUS. 1997 REPORT, supra note 49, 198 tbl.D-2. There were 45,902 
federal criminal cases filed in 1993. Id. at 196 tbl.D-2. 
 87. See id. at 198. There were 49,655 federal criminal cases filed in 1997. Id. at 196 
tbl.D-2. 
 88. In 2001, 11,288 of 62,134 criminal cases filed featured an immigration offense as 
the lead charge. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2005 ANNUAL 
REPORT 11, 225, 227 tbl.D-2. 
 89. See id. at 227 tbl.D-2. There were 2036 illegal entry cases and 7203 illegal reentry 
cases filed in 2001. 
 90. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Immigration Prosecutions for January 
2013, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Mar. 5, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/ 
immigration/monthlyjan13/fil/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). 
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which illegal entry (13,960) or illegal reentry (17,679) was the lead 
charge.91 The next year they filed 49,663 illegal entry cases and 
21,320 illegal reentry cases for a total of 70,983 cases.92 Case filings 
for these two offenses continued to increase, topping off at 84,301 
in 2009, but remaining well above pre-2008 levels: 79,524 in 2010 
and 71,644 in 2011.93 In 2004, immigration offenses for the first 
time became the single largest type of crime prosecuted in federal 
courts.94 As recently as 2011 there were more federal criminal 
immigration cases lodged each year than prosecutions for violent 
crimes, drug offenses, or any other type of federal crime.95 
Meanwhile, the states have also attempted to penalize 
immigration law violations. In a well-documented trend that is 
unlike anything seen since at least the late 1800s when states were 
last heavily involved in regulating immigration, state legislators 
introduced well over a thousand immigration-related proposals each 
year between 2007 and 2011, and another 983 proposals in 2012.96 
 
 91. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Lead Charges for Criminal 
Immigration Prosecutions: FY 1986-FY 2011, TRAC IMMIGRATION, 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/ 251/include/imm_charges.html (last visited Sept. 
15, 2013). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. According to TRAC, there were 54,175 and 30,126 cases in which illegal entry 
and illegal reentry, respectively, were the lead charges in 2009; 43,688 and 35,836 for illegal 
entry and illegal reentry, respectively, in 2010; and a projected 34,540 and 37,104 for illegal 
entry and illegal reentry, respectively, in 2011. Id. 
 94. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Immigration Enforcement: New 
Findings, TRAC DHS (Aug. 24, 2005), http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/latest/current/ (“[I]n 
FY 2004, immigration matters now represent the single largest group of all federal 
prosecutions . . . .”). 
 95. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Comparing Program Areas: Federal 
Judicial District: U.S., TRAC DHS, 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/highlights/v04/dhsallprog_fil. html (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) 
(explaining that 32.5% of prosecutions in fiscal year 2004 were for immigration offenses while 
the next highest category, narcotics/drugs, came in at 26.6%). Data from federal district courts 
alone indicate that in 2011 there were 28,435 immigration prosecutions lodged, eclipsing drug 
offenses, the second most prosecuted category, which came in at 16,109 prosecutions. Table 
D-2: Cases: U.S. District Courts—Criminal Cases Commenced, by Offense, During the 12-Month 
Periods Ending March 31, 2007 Through 2011, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/Federal 
JudicialCaseloadStatistics/2011/tables/D02CMar11.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). 
 96. 2012 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States (Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 2012), 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES tbl.1 (Jan. 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/immig/2012-immigration-related-laws-jan-december-2012.aspx (last visited Sept. 
15, 2013). According to the NCSL report, in 2007, 1562 proposals were introduced and 240 
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A total of 1229 of these proposals were enacted.97 Though the 
enacted laws run the gamut of immigration legislation—everything 
from access to education to voting—102 of the laws enacted from 
2010 to 2012 address state and local law enforcement officials’ 
involvement in regulating immigration.98 Arizona, Alabama, and 
Georgia’s wide-ranging laws made headlines, with Arizona’s Senate 
Bill 1070—unflatteringly described as the “show me your papers” 
law by opponents—making its way to the Supreme Court.99 Aside 
from these high-profile enactments, states and localities have become 
accustomed to using criminal prosecutions to target noncitizens. 
Some prosecutors have adopted policies in which they tailor criminal 
prosecutions to increase the likelihood that the criminal process 
results in removal.100 Some states have restricted bail for criminal 
defendants thought to lack authorization to be present in the United 
States.101 In Arizona, unauthorized migrants are sometimes 
prosecuted for smuggling themselves under the state’s human 
smuggling offense.102 One New Hampshire police chief even sought, 
ultimately without success, to use the state’s criminal trespass offense 
to punish unauthorized individuals present in the state.103 
 
enacted; in 2008, 1305 introduced and 206 enacted; in 2009, 1500 introduced and 222 
enacted; in 2010, 1400 enacted and 208 enacted; in 2011, 1607 introduced and 197 enacted; 
and in 2012, 983 introduced and 156 enacted. Id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id. at tbl.2. NCSL explains that “[t]hese laws address a wide range of law 
enforcement areas, from firearm possession and domestic violence to drug manufacturing and 
trafficking.” Id. 
 99. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 100. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in 
Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1170–80 (2013). 
 101. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before 
SB 1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749, 1762–63 (2011) (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3906 (2010) and ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22) [hereinafter Eagly, Immigration Prosecution]; 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-11-105(c), -118(e) (2013). 
 102. See Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution, supra note 101, at 1752–53. 
 103. Pam Belluck, Novel Tack on Illegal Immigrants: Trespass Charges, N.Y. TIMES, July 
13, 2005, at A14. 
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C. Bringing Civil Immigration Law Procedures to Criminal Policing 
and Prosecutions 
A third trend emblematic of the convergence of criminal law 
and immigration law also appears in criminal law enforcement 
practices and judicial proceedings: dispensing with certain 
procedural protections traditionally afforded criminal defendants 
when immigration-related activity forms the basis for the criminal 
prosecution. In deviating from traditional criminal practice, these 
proceedings seem to “borrow” lesser procedural protections from 
immigration courts, which are not subject to the panoply of 
constitutional limitations on the government’s power to punish 
that are embodied in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments 
because they concern only civil immigration matters. 
Modern policing practices have frequently conflated immigration 
and criminal law enforcement goals while relying on lax 
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment that are rooted in civil 
immigration law. For almost thirty years, the Supreme Court has 
limited the Fourth Amendment’s reach into civil immigration 
proceedings.104 Relying on this precedent, the Eighth Circuit, for 
example, permitted the use of evidence obtained by police officers 
investigating traditional criminal offenses to be used against 
noncitizens in immigration proceedings.105 In another decision, the 
Supreme Court held that noncitizens were not “seized” for Fourth 
Amendment purposes even though INS agents filled their workplace 
and stood in front of doors and windows as other agents moved 
across the factory floor speaking to each individual.106 Similarly, the 
Fourth Circuit held that a West Virginia sheriff’s deputy did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment even though he took time to call 
ICE during a routine automobile stop for a speeding infraction.107 
 
 104. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1045–50 (1984) (holding that the 
exclusionary rule generally does not apply in immigration proceedings). 
 105. See Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 775–80 (8th Cir. 2010) (allowing the use of 
identification information obtained by police without probable cause or an applicable Fourth 
Amendment exception). 
 106. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217–19 (1984). 
 107. See United States v. Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757, 770 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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Some ICE agents have taken this relaxed view of the Fourth 
Amendment to heart. The ICE officer in charge of a raid of homes 
on Long Island ostensibly targeting suspected gang members, for 
example, explained his understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement as follows: “We didn’t have warrants . . . . We 
don’t need warrants to make the arrests. These are illegal 
immigrants.”108 In an effort to curtail such conduct—but also a tacit 
admission that it is widespread—ICE agreed to instruct its agents 
about Fourth Amendment limitations on their activities.109 
Likewise, the Supreme Court’s relaxed interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause in immigration proceedings 
appears to have spilled into criminal prosecutions. Perhaps the most 
significant example of federal prosecutions adopting less rigid 
protections emblematic of civil immigration proceedings is 
Operation Streamline, a federal response to the enormous number of 
immigration prosecutions filed every year.110 The federal criminal 
system was simply not equipped with the resources necessary to 
manage this unprecedented workload. According to the Judicial 
Council of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, these 
cases were “crushing” district courts within its jurisdiction.111 Started 
in 2005, this initiative allows courts to adjudicate criminal 
immigration cases en masse—as many as 100 defendants appear at 
the same time before a judge.112 Some attorneys involved in 
Operation Streamline proceedings refer to this as “assembly-line 
justice.”113 After witnessing these proceedings in Tucson, one 
commentator, clearly appalled, described a scene where 
 
 108. Nina Bernstein, Raids Were a Shambles, Nassau Complains to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
3, 2007, at C12. 
 109. See Aguilar v. ICE, No. 1:07-cv-08224-KBF, slip op. at 5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 
2013). 
 110. See Donald Kerwin & Kristen McCabe, Arrested on Entry: Operation Streamline and 
the Prosecution of Immigration Crimes, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Apr. 29, 2010), 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/print.cfm?ID=780. 
 111. In re Approval of Jud. Emer. Decl. in Dist. of Ariz., 639 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 112. See Kerwin & McCabe, supra note 110. 
 113. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1351 
n.405 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) [hereinafter Eagly, Prosecuting 
Immigration]. For a compelling discussion of the procedural shortcomings Operation 
Streamline creates, see Chacón, supra note 16, at 145–47. 
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approximately seventy defendants were processed: “It is doubtful 
that most truly understand what they are agreeing to, often 
encountering the US court system for their first time, dealing with 
an interpreter, and being rushed through the system (each defendant 
is given one hour at most with a lawyer, shared with several other 
defendants, and the hearings typically last less than two hours for the 
entire seventy defendants).”114 The Chief Judge of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of New Mexico expressed similar concerns 
when he explained that judges “try very hard to conduct their 
hearings in a way that is understandable to the defendants,” but then 
noted that most defendants in these proceedings have little formal 
education and minimal knowledge of the U.S. legal system.115 Such 
proceedings clash with the requirement of Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11(b) that, prior to accepting a plea, the court address 
each defendant “personally” and ensure that each plea is entered 
voluntarily.116 Conversely, these en masse hearings actually resemble 
civil immigration proceedings where immigration judges preside over 
multiple cases per day with some studies indicating that they have as 
few as seventy-three minutes per matter.117 In addition, the en masse 
style of these proceedings treads on the attorney-client privilege by 
making it difficult for attorneys to consult with defendants in 
private.118 This too resembles immigration proceedings insofar as 
attorneys frequently lack private spaces in which to meet with clients, 
especially when proceedings are conducted by televideo equipment 
and the attorney is not in the same location as the client.119 
 
 114. Andrew Burridge, Differential Criminalization Under Operation Streamline: 
Challenges to Freedom of Movement and Humanitarian Aid Provision in the Mexico-US 
Borderlands, 26 REFUGE 78, 81 (2009). 
 115. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON THE IMPACT ON THE JUDICIARY 
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER 16 (2008). 
 116. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2); see United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 699–
701 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that an Operation Streamline proceeding prevented the court 
from meeting its obligation under Rule 11, but going on to uphold the conviction because the 
defendant failed to satisfy the applicable standard of review). But see United States v. Arqueta-
Ramos, 730 F.3d 1133, 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that a conviction obtained 
through an Operation Streamline proceeding violated Rule 11 and vacating the conviction). 
 117. Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 
1635, 1651–52 (2010). 
 118. Juan Rocha, Operation Streamline and the Criminal Justice System, THE 
CHAMPION, Nov. 2011, at 30. 
 119. See DORA SCHRIRO, IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND 
 
DO NOT DELETE 1/27/2014 11:03 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
1478 
Besides incorporating civil immigration law’s relaxed approach to 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment doctrines, criminal prosecutions of 
immigration-related activity now exhibit immigration law’s looser 
approach to assistance of counsel. In the 1990s, federal prosecutors 
began a practice of “fast-track” plea agreements.120 These “plea 
agreements offer noncitizen defendants charged with an immigration 
crime a reduced sentence in exchange for quickly waiving a host of 
rights and consenting to immediate sentencing and removal.”121 
Today, fast-track pleas require that defendants waive the right to 
suppress evidence, challenge the sufficiency of the charging 
document, appeal, and seek a sentencing variance.122 Because fast-
track plea offers typically require defendants to decide whether to 
accept or reject a plea offer within two weeks, some criminal defense 
attorneys have complained that they do not have enough time to 
adequately investigate the law and facts pertinent to the client’s 
predicament.123 Although no court has held as much regarding fast-
track pleas, criminal defense attorneys who advise their clients about 
the best course of action without engaging in thorough investigation 
of the relevant law and facts would seem to deny these defendants 
the right to effective assistance of counsel provided by the Sixth 
Amendment.124 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 23 (2009); Letter from Robert D. Evans, Dir., Am. Bar Ass’n Gov’t 
Affairs Office, to Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge 2 (Dec. 19, 2003), available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/poladv/letters/108th/immig121903.pdf; see also SEATTLE 
UNIV. SCH. OF LAW INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, VOICES FROM DETENTION: A REPORT 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AT THE NORTHWEST DETENTION CENTER 37–39 (2008) 
(noting that immigration detention staff can overhear conversations between attorneys and 
detained clients). 
 120. See Alan D. Bersin & Judith S. Feigin, The Rule of Law at the Border: Reinventing 
Prosecution Policy in the Southern District of California, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 285, 301 
(1998). 
 121. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Strickland-Lite: Padilla’s Two-Tiered Duty for 
Noncitizens, 72 MD. L. REV. 844, 918 (2013). 
 122. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to 
All U.S. Attorneys 3–4 (Jan. 31, 2012), available at www.justice.gov/dag/fast-track-
program.pdf. 
 123. See Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, supra note 113, at 1322; Joint Statement of 
Thomas W. Hillier II, Fed. Pub. Defender, W. Dist. of Wash., & Davina Chen, Assistant Fed. 
Pub. Defender, Cent. Dist. of Cal., The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: 25 Years Later: Public 
Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm. 28 (May 27, 2009). 
 124. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690–91 (1984); García Hernández, 
supra note 121, at 921–22. 
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A relaxed interpretation of the right to assistance of counsel fits 
neatly into immigration law, but less so within the law of criminal 
procedure. Individuals in immigration proceedings are granted a 
statutory right to counsel and some federal courts even recognize a 
constitutional right to counsel that arises from the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.125 One circuit hinted at the 
possibility of a constitutional right to appointed counsel in some 
circumstances, but no court has ever actually appointed counsel in an 
immigration proceeding under this reasoning.126 Moreover, the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel does not apply to immigration 
proceedings.127 In contrast, criminal proceedings are subject to the 
extensive body of law interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s counsel 
guarantee, including its requirement that counsel provide effective 
assistance.128 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky129 arguably 
follows this trend. Though recognizing for the first time that the 
Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel requires 
defense attorneys to provide noncitizen clients with advice about the 
immigration consequences of conviction, Padilla adopts an approach 
that I have elsewhere dubbed “Strickland-lite” to signify its 
weakening of the standard for effective assistance of counsel that 
usually applies in criminal proceedings.130 Rather than ensuring that 
criminal defendants are fully informed about the immigration risk 
associated with pleading guilty or nolo contendere to a criminal 
charge, Padilla requires less of criminal defense attorneys by way of  
 
 
 125. INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012); see Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 
374 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Uspango v. Ashcroft, 289 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2002)); United 
States v. Torres-Sanchez, 68 F.3d 227, 230 (8th Cir. 1995); Jiang v. Houseman, 904 F. Supp. 
971, 978 (D. Minn. 1995); Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D. Tex. 1982). 
 126. Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 1975); see Geoffrey Heeren, 
Illegal Aid: Legal Assistance to Immigrants in the United States, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 619, 
668 (2011). 
 127. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 237 (1960) (holding that “deportation 
proceedings are not subject to the constitutional safeguards for criminal prosecutions”); Matter 
of Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 716–17 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 
25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2009) (collecting cases from the federal circuits). 
 128. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685. 
 129. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 130. See generally García Hernández, supra note 121. 
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investigating the client’s circumstance, an approach which privileges 
efficiency over illumination.131 
Combined, these developments alter the very nature of criminal 
proceedings. Rather than the robust—though susceptible to all 
manner of criticism—norms that have traditionally protected 
criminal defendants from the state’s prosecutorial power, “we are . . . 
witnessing the importation of the relaxed procedural norms of civil 
immigration proceedings into the criminal realm.”132 Operation 
Streamline, fast-track plea agreements, and Padilla’s relaxed effective 
assistance of counsel requirement are evocative not of traditional 
criminal proceedings, but rather of immigration proceedings where 
noncitizens are processed en masse, rights are limited, and legal 
counsel is viewed as a luxury rather than a necessity. 
D. Policing Crimmigration Law 
As substantive and procedural criminal law has become 
increasingly intertwined with substantive and procedural 
immigration law, the methods of policing the two bodies of law have 
transcended the historic boundary between the two.133 Today, it is 
appropriate to talk of “policing immigration”134 and immigration-
izing traditional criminal policing.135 No better lens through which 
to study this convergence exists than detention. The number of 
noncitizens confined to a secured facility—whether a county jail or a 
specialized immigration detention center—is at unprecedented 
levels.136 Meanwhile, the explosive growth of federal criminal  
 
 
 
 131. See id. at 921–22. 
 132. Chacón, supra note 16, at 137. 
 133. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 
87 (2013) (claiming that the Secure Communities program “accelerates the ongoing 
convergence of the immigration and criminal bureaucracies in the United States”). 
 134. See generally id. 
 135. See Chacón, supra note 16, at 137 (explaining “that the protective features of 
criminal investigation and adjudication are melting away at the edges in certain criminal cases 
involving migration-related offenses”). 
 136. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 46–47 
(2011); see Heather Ann Thompson, Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, 
Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American History, 97 J. AM. HIST. 703, 703–04 
(2010). 
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prosecutions for immigration-related activity means “[n]oncitizens 
have become the face of federal prisons.”137 
Immigration detention, historically little used, has become the 
most salient feature of immigration law enforcement. In fiscal year 
2011, DHS maintained custody of 429,247 people.138 This figure 
represented its largest number of detained individuals to date and the 
first time the immigration detainee population topped 400,000.139 It 
was, however, a continuation of a recent trend of a growing 
detention population.140 Importantly, these detained individuals are 
not awaiting criminal prosecution or serving a penalty for having 
been convicted of a crime. DHS has no authority to impose 
detention for such reasons.141 Instead, they are detained while 
waiting to learn whether they will be allowed to remain in the 
United States.142 This is an administrative determination adjudicated 
through the federal government’s immigration bureaucracy—ICE, 
the immigration courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and, in 
some instances, reviewed by the federal courts.143 On average, 
individuals spend between one and three months in immigration 
confinement.144 Based on 2009 data, between one and three percent 
of individuals remained in detention longer than one year.145 Applied 
 
 137. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, supra note 113, at 1282. 
 138. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2011 
ANNUAL REPORT 5 tbl.4 (2012). 
 139. See DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 126 fig.30 (2013) (graphically charting the 
immigration detention population since 2001). 
 140. See id. 
 141. Id. at 125. 
 142. See INA § 236(a), (c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), (c) (2012); INA § 241(a)(1)–(2), 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 143. See DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW & CRIMES 
§ 8:20; Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting 
Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1684 (2011); see also Mark 
Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily 
Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 64 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 75 (2012) 
(graphically displaying the administrative process for detaining an individual in removal 
proceedings). 
 144. See Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 
45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601, 602 n.6 (2010) (citing competing estimates, one by ICE 
and another by the Migration Policy Institute, reporting that, on average, people remained in 
immigration detention thirty days or eighty-one days, respectively). 
 145. See id. 
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to DHS’s 2011 population, this would mean that between 4292 and 
12,877 individuals had spent more than a year waiting to learn their 
fate while sitting in a detention facility. 
The facilities in which noncitizens are held pending 
immigration adjudications frequently carry all the hallmarks of 
penal confinement.146 They are operated based on standards 
developed for penal incarceration.147 Like prisons and jails used 
to detain criminal inmates, detention centers are secure 
environments where inmates’ movements are strictly dictated 
and closely observed.148 Segregated housing is not uncommon.149 
The largest facilities tend to be located in remote areas far 
removed from legal communities of any significant size and 
social support networks.150 And most attesting to their penal 
character, many facilities—though each holds few detainees—are 
in fact jails from which ICE has simply rented space.151 
Meanwhile, several policing trends that originated in 
immigration law enforcement have expanded into criminal law 
enforcement. Like many people serving sentences as a result of a 
criminal conviction,152 a growing number of immigration detainees 
are confined in privately owned or operated prisons.153 Neither ICE 
 
 146. See SCHRIRO, supra note 119, at 4. 
 147. See MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 139, at 128. 
 148. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS: TRANSFORMING THE U.S. 
IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM—A TWO-YEAR REVIEW 8, 35 (2011). Human Rights 
First contends that immigration detainees are permitted less freedom of movement within the 
facility than inmates at thirty-five Bureau of Prison facilities. Id. at 36. 
 149. See NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., INVISIBLE IN ISOLATION: THE USE OF 
SEGREGATION AND SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION 3 (2012); see also 
Ian Urbina & Catherine Rentz, Immigrants Held in Solitary Cells, Often for Weeks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2013, at A1. 
 150. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Due Process and Immigrant Detainee 
Prison Transfers: Moving LPRs to Isolated Prisons Violates Their Right to Counsel, 21 BERKELEY 
LA RAZA L.J. 17, 17–21 (2011). 
 151. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 148, at iii. 
 152. See E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2011, 32 appx. tbl.15 (2012) (indicating that 130,941 
state or federal prisoners were held in private prisons). According to The Sentencing Project, 
over 130,000 people were incarcerated in private jails or prisons associated with a criminal 
prosecution or conviction in 2011, representing approximately 8% of the total criminal jail and 
prison population that year. See CODY MASON, INTERNATIONAL GROWTH TRENDS IN PRISON 
PRIVATIZATION 9 (2013). 
 153. See The Influence of the Private Prison Industry in Immigration Detention, DET. 
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nor its predecessor, INS, has built its own facility since the late 
1990s.154 Yet, its capacity has grown exponentially since then. This 
growth has come in part through contracts with private prison 
corporations, especially the Corrections Corporation of America 
(“CCA”) and the GEO Group, the country’s two largest such 
companies.155 Indeed, an INS contract with CCA in 1983 launched 
the modern era of private imprisonment.156 Since then, private 
prisons have come to fill approximately half of the nation’s 
immigration detention demand.157 
Other tactics associated with immigration law policing have also 
gained traction in the criminal realm and expanded detention. The 
suspicionless searches that have long characterized immigration law 
enforcement along the southwest border158 have become a feature of 
policing in nearly every jurisdiction in the United States through the 
Obama Administration’s enthusiastic support of the Secure 
Communities program.159 Through Secure Communities, law 
enforcement agencies effectively partner with ICE to identify 
potentially removable individuals by sharing with the federal agency 
identification information about every person taken into police 
custody.160 In this way, the federal government augments its 
immigration law enforcement capacity by tapping the workforce of 
police agencies throughout the country. This expanded reach 
increases the detained population in two ways. First, it increases the 
length of time individuals are held by criminal police authorities 
 
WATCH NETWORK, http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons (last visited July 
25, 2013); see also TOM BARRY, BORDER WARS 4 (2011) (describing private immigration 
prisons as “the new face of imprisonment in America”). 
 154. See Corrections Corp. of America, Investor Presentation 20 (Mar. 2012), available at 
http://crimmigration.com/files/0/6/4/7/5/167292-157460/Q4_2011_Investor_Presentation.pdf. 
 155. See id. at 7. 
 156. BARRY, supra note 153, at 10. 
 157. See The Influence of the Private Prison Industry in Immigration Detention, supra note 153. 
 158. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004) (explaining 
that the federal government is authorized to conduct suspicionless searches at the border). 
 159. As of August 22, 2012, Secure Communities was active in 97% of jurisdictions in 
the United States. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Activated Jurisdictions, 
ICE.GOV, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated2.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2013). 
 160. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities: The Secure 
Communities Process, ICE.GOV, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Sept. 
15, 2013). 
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because ICE issues a “detainer” on people who are identified as 
potentially removable.161 In the agency’s view, detainers allow it to 
request that the law enforcement agency maintain custody for up to 
forty-eight hours after the basis for criminally detaining the 
individual ends.162 Second, because the individuals identified 
through Secure Communities have already interacted with the 
criminal justice system (through the form of police officers, at a 
minimum), many have been convicted of a crime. According to ICE, 
approximately 1.1 million people convicted of any crime were 
identified through Secure Communities between fiscal year 2009 
and fiscal year 2012.163 Since ICE does not report the types of 
offenses that these people were convicted of committing, it is not 
possible to know what percentage was subject to immigration 
detention. Nonetheless, the INA’s mandatory detention provisions 
are quite broad and cover offenses as serious as rape and as minor as 
simple marijuana possession.164 The statute’s discretionary detention 
provision, of course, allows an immigration judge to deny bond to 
any person who does not fall into a mandatory detention basis but is 
deemed dangerous or at risk of absconding.165 As such, it is 
reasonable to assume that many of these 1.1 million were detained 
pending removal proceedings. 
The end result of the expanded list of crimes that may result in 
removal, the growing willingness to regulate immigration through 
federal and subfederal penal codes, the adoption of relaxed 
procedural norms to prosecute immigration crimes, and the 
conflation of immigration and criminal policing norms has melted 
away a stark boundary that once existed between criminal law and 
immigration law. Instead, “the civil immigration system and the 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities: Monthly Statistics 
Through September 30, 2012, ICE.GOV, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-
stats/nationwide_interop_ stats-fy2012.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). 
 164. See INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012). Section 236(c) references INA 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) which in turn references the “aggravated felony” term that is defined at 
INA § 101(a)(43)(A) to include rape. Section 236(c) also references INA § 237(a)(2)(B), 
which includes any controlled substance offense including simple possession of marijuana 
“other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less.” INA 
§ 237(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B). 
 165. See INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/27/2014 11:03 AM 
1457 Creating Crimmigration 
 1485 
criminal justice system are a single, intertwined regulatory 
bureaucracy that moves between criminal and civil enforcement 
mechanisms.”166 Remaining to be discussed, though, is why this 
conflation occurred when it did during the closing decades of the 
twentieth century. To understand that, it is important to place 
crimmigration law within the social and legal context in which it 
initially developed. 
III. CONTEXTUALIZING CRIMMIGRATION 
As detailed above, criminal law and immigration law have 
intersected to some degree since the earliest days of the nation’s 
history. Throughout those centuries, antagonism toward noncitizens 
has appeared regularly, and special vile has been heaped onto 
individuals with criminal records. Yet, the deep intertwinement of 
criminal law and immigration law that has come to be known as 
crimmigration law did not develop until the 1980s and 1990s. What 
was different about the closing decades of the twentieth century that 
produced the development of crimmigration law? The answer lies in 
the evolving role that race occupies in law. Cultural and legal shifts 
in race relations spurred by the civil rights movements of the mid-
twentieth century constrained reliance on overt racism. In place of 
openly racist rhetoric and de jure racism, policymakers adopted 
facially neutral legal regimes in criminal law and procedure and 
immigration law and procedure that proved anything but racially 
neutral in practice. Crucially, lawmakers concerned about the civil 
rights era’s elimination of cultural and legal mechanisms used to 
subordinate entire racial groups turned to the government’s criminal 
law power to stigmatize and punish. With the legitimacy of 
ostensibly race-neutral criminal law and procedure, lawmakers 
reproduced the racial hierarchies of decades past. 
A. Post-Civil Rights Constraints on Overt Racism 
A final verdict on the success of the civil rights struggles of the 
1940s-1970s remains unwritten, if such an assessment is even 
possible.167 What is clear, however, is that the broad-based efforts 
 
 166. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, supra note 113, at 1359. 
 167. See HARVARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY, 1954–1992, vii–viii 
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organized in those decades radically changed the way that the 
United States discusses race. On the whole, it is no longer culturally 
acceptable to speak of communities or individuals of color in 
blatantly derogatory language.168 In large part, it is also not 
permissible to legally marginalize or discriminate against groups of 
people of color based on race alone. These mid-century 
accomplishments literally altered the face of immigration law. 
Prior to the civil rights era, immigration discourse was explicitly 
focused on pejorative racialized depictions of prospective 
immigrants. As Frank P. Sargent, who from 1902 to 1908 served as 
the nation’s first Commissioner of Immigration, explained while 
speaking about the Chinese, there were “difficulties inherent in the 
character of the Mongolian race to be met and surmounted,” and he 
would do all he could to ensure that immigration law enforcement 
under his watch met this challenge.169 Albert Johnson, a United 
States Senator who spearheaded passage of the National Origins Act 
of 1924, wrote of the perils of “Russian Poles or Polish Jews of the 
usual ghetto type . . . . They are filthy un-American and often 
dangerous in their habits.”170 No more influential example of this 
prevailing wisdom exists than the Senate commission led by Senator 
William Dillingham, which, relying on the theory of scientific racism 
that claimed that blacks, Asians, and southern and eastern Europeans 
were inferior to northern and western Europeans, concluded that the 
United States needed to slow immigration from southern and 
eastern Europe—the principal sources of that period’s immigrants.171 
This and similar rhetoric led to a host of restrictionist 
immigration laws premised on race-based exclusions. The Chinese 
 
(1993) (describing writing a history of the civil rights era as a “hazardous task”). 
 168. The reaction to revelations that celebrity chef Paula Deen made racist comments 
exemplifies the cultural disapproval of explicitly expressing such attitudes. See Tom Dart, Paula 
Deen Let Go by Food Network Over Use of Racially-Charged Language, THE GUARDIAN (U.K) 
(June 22, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/22/paula-deen-food-
network-racial-language. 
 169. ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA’S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE 
EXCLUSION ERA, 1882–1943, at 67 (2003). 
 170. PETER SCHRAG, NOT FIT FOR OUR SOCIETY: IMMIGRATION AND NATIVISM IN 
AMERICA 115 (2010). 
 171. See HULL, supra note 19, at 14; see also DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: 
THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA 250, 250 (2002) (describing the 
Dillingham Commission’s findings as “pseudoscientific” and nativist). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/27/2014 11:03 AM 
1457 Creating Crimmigration 
 1487 
Exclusion Act famously identified its target group in the law’s name. 
In 1917, Congress barred entry of anyone whose ancestry was traced 
to the “so-called Asiatic Barred Zone.”172 These exclusionary laws 
meant that Asian populations would remain low for decades to 
come.173 Later enactments were barely less overt in their 
discriminatory intent, though they branched beyond Asians. The 
National Origins Act, enacted in 1921 and part of immigration law 
for the next four decades, allotted visas for new immigrants not by 
family ties or employment, as immigration law presently does, but 
rather by country of origin, thereby allotting numerical quotas for 
ethnic backgrounds.174 Worse, it expressly favored immigration by 
racial groups already dominant in the United States by tying future 
immigration to the number of citizens of particular countries that 
were in the United States in 1910.175 Three years later, Congress 
pegged the new immigrant quota to the 1890 Census and capped 
total European immigration at 150,000 per year.176 Western 
Hemisphere countries were not subject to the quota.177 Given the 
origins of the population at that time, the end result of the two 
quota acts indisputably favored prospective immigrants from 
northern and western Europe: Great Britain, for example, which at 
the time had approximately two percent of the world’s population, 
received forty-three percent of the allotment.178 Asians, in contrast, 
were almost entirely excluded.179 
Mexicans too would suffer no shortage of overtly discriminatory 
measures. In 1951, President Harry Truman’s Commission on 
Migratory Labor cautioned that “wetback traffic . . . is virtually an 
 
 172. See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the 
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 14 (1998). 
 173. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN AMERICA 18 (2004). 
 174. See James F. Smith, A Nation That Welcomes Immigrants? An Historical 
Examination of United States Immigration Policy, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 227, 232 
(1995); see also INA § 203(a)-(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)-(b) (2012) (providing the current 
family-based and employment-based immigration options). 
 175. See Immigration Act of 1921, ch. 8, §§ 2(a)-(c), 42 Stat. 5, 5-6. 
 176. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, ch. 190, § 11(a), (b), 43 Stat. 153, 
159; see HULL, supra note 19, at 18. 
 177. Smith, supra note 174, at 232. 
 178. See HULL, supra note 19, at 18. 
 179. See id. 
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invasion,” using what Kanstroom describes as “a racial epithet with 
stereotypical images of law-breaking Mexican border crossers, the 
archetypal ‘illegal alien.’”180 Meanwhile, the United States and 
Mexican governments implemented multiple strategies targeting 
unauthorized emigration from México into the United States.181 
These initiatives famously climaxed in the summer of 1954 when the 
Border Patrol, acting at Attorney General Herbert Brownell’s 
instruction, launched Operation Wetback.182 According to Kelly 
Lytle Hernández, “eight hundred Border Patrol officers swept 
through the southwestern United States performing a series of raids, 
road blocks, and mass deportations. By the end of the year, Brownell 
was able to announce that the summer campaign had been a success 
by contributing to the apprehension and deportation of over one 
million persons, mostly Mexican nationals, during 1954.”183 
A decade later, the world, and the United States within it, was a 
different place. Through sustained organizing and, not 
uncommonly, physical injury and loss of life, civil rights activists had 
caught the public’s attention and propelled key legislation through 
Congress, including the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
Voting Rights Act of 1965. In different ways, each piece of 
legislation sought to stem the decades of overt racial discrimination 
that had been heaped onto communities of color. Simultaneously, 
the Cold War, then at its peak, injected a dose of foreign policy 
realism into domestic affairs. When the INS Commissioner in the 
early 1950s proposed building a fence and watch towers along 
portions of the Arizona and California border, the State Department 
“envisioned photographs in the Moscow newspapers” and 
objected.184 Likewise, President Truman, in vetoing the Immigration 
Act of 1952 (which was subsequently enacted after Congress 
overrode his veto), described the national origins quotas that the bill 
maintained as “a slur on the patriotism . . . of our citizenry” and 
 
 180. KANSTROOM, supra note 6, at 221, 223. A year after Operation Wetback, the INS 
proclaimed that it sought to curtail the “wetback invasion.” HULL, supra note 19, at 84. 
 181. See Kelly Lytle Hernández, The Crimes and Consequences of Illegal Immigration: A 
Cross-Border Examination of Operation Wetback, 1943 to 1954, 37 W. HIST. Q. 421, 422 
(2006). 
 182. See id. 
 183. Id. at 421. 
 184. NGAI, supra note 173, at 156. 
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argued that, instead, the United States needed “a fitting instrument 
for our foreign policy and a true reflection of the ideals we stand for, 
at home and abroad.”185 That instrument, according to liberals of 
the era, was an immigration policy that subjected everyone to a 
regime of formal equality—where prospective immigrants from every 
country were treated identically and qualifying criteria for new 
immigrant visas were not tied to markers of race.186 
Buoyed by the civil rights movement’s successes, Congress 
followed that liberal vision of formal equality the next time it enacted 
immigration legislation.187 Over four decades after they were initially 
adopted, the Immigration Act of 1965 (commonly referred to as the 
Hart-Celler Act) finally repealed the national origins quotas, ending 
an overtly racist form of restrictionist immigration policies.188 The 
1965 Act’s most striking alteration of immigration law was to impose 
uniform immigration rules on large sets of countries.189 Among 
other changes, the Act allotted each country of the Eastern 
Hemisphere 20,000 visas per year with a maximum of 170,000.190 
Unlike previous enactments, however, the Act imposed a cap of 
120,000 to be divided according to demand by Western Hemisphere 
countries.191 Eleven years later, in 1976, Congress extended the per-
country limit to the Western Hemisphere.192 With the exception of 
parents, spouses, and unmarried minor children of United States 
citizens, only 20,000 people from any given country could receive 
permission to enter the United States each year.193 
 
 
 185. Id. at 239. 
 186. See id. at 245. 
 187. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO 
RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 51, 103 (2007) (linking the civil rights 
movement to enactment of the 1965 act); MOTOMURA, supra note 12, at 132 (“[T]he [1965] 
amendments were part of a basic movement toward civil rights in American public law that 
included the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”); NGAI, supra note 
173, at 13 (explaining that the “conventional view” was that the 1965 act was a “liberal 
reform”). 
 188. See NGAI, supra note 173, at 227. 
 189. See MOTOMURA, supra note 12, at 131. 
 190. See NGAI, supra note 173, at 258. 
 191. See id.; see also id. at 254 (“The Immigration Acts of 1924 and 1952 did not impose 
numerical restrictions on immigration from countries of the Western Hemisphere.”). 
 192. See id. at 261. 
 193. See id. at 258. 
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Citizens of countries that had long been under tight immigration 
controls made quick use of the Hart-Celler Act’s liberalization. 
Asians, in particular, experienced newfound immigration 
opportunities in light of the 1965 Act.194 Most immigration by 
Asians was prohibited from the closing decades of the nineteenth 
century through the bulk of the twentieth century’s first half.195 The 
1952 Act eliminated the last of the Asian exclusion laws—applied 
until then against Japanese and Koreans—but imposed restrictive 
quotas on all immigration from the “Asia Pacific Triangle.”196 The 
Hart-Celler Act’s equal allotment of visas to each country suddenly 
opened new paths to the United States.197 By 1971, four of the top 
six countries outside the Western Hemisphere from which new 
immigrants arrived were in Asia.198 
At the same time, the Hart-Cellar Act propagated a more subtle 
set of policies that converted immigration from particular countries 
with significant and long-standing ties to the United States, 
especially México, into the picture of illegality199 by inaugurating an 
era of immigration controls from Latin America unlike anything 
previously imposed. The hemisphere-wide cap and the country-
specific limit as applied to Mexican immigration proved woefully 
lower than demand.200 Indeed, a commission created by the Hart-
Celler Act to study its implementation urged a repeal of the 
hemispheric maximum and, if per-country ceilings were to exist, 
 
 194. LEE, supra note 169, at 246. 
 195. See id. As an illustration of this regional exclusion, the Immigration Act of 1917 
referenced the “Asiatic Barred Zone” that “effectively excluded all immigrants from India, 
Burma, Siam, the Malay States, Arabia, Afghanistan, part of Russia, and most of the Polynesian 
Islands.” Id. at 39. With the exception of Filipinos, Asian exclusion was “perfected,” Lee 
writes, by immigration statutes enacted in 1921 and 1924; Filipinos were excluded in 1934. 
Id. 
 196. See NGAI, supra note 173, at 238. 
 197. See MOTOMURA, supra note 12, at 133. 
 198. See NGAI, supra note 173, at 262 & n.120 (noting that the top sending countries to 
the USA in 1971 were, in order, the Philippines, Italy, Greece, China, India, and Korea). 
 199. See NGAI, supra note 173, at 227 (positing that the 1965 Act “reproduce[d] the 
problem of illegal immigration, especially from Mexico, to the present day”); see also 
DOROTHEE SCHNEIDER, CROSSING BORDERS: MIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 238–39 (2011) (noting the 1965 Act’s adverse impact 
on Mexican immigration). 
 200. See KELLY LYTLE HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRA!: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. BORDER PATROL 
214 (2010) [hereinafter HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRA!]. 
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proposed that each Western Hemisphere country be allotted 40,000 
slots.201 Even 40,000 would have been substantially lower than the 
number of Mexicans entering the United States with some form of 
authorization to work in the early 1960s, which was upwards of 
200,000 per year.202 
When Hart-Celler’s limitations went into effect, the result was as 
immediate as it was long lasting. Mexicans kept coming to the 
United States—indeed, Mexican migration appears to have increased 
after 1965 because an established Mexican community existed in the 
United States by then and the Mexican economy soured—only now 
they lacked permission to do so.203 Net unauthorized migration—
that is, the difference between the number of unauthorized 
individuals who entered the country and those who left—jumped 
from zero before the 1965 Act was enacted to approximately 
300,000 per year by the close of the 1980s.204 The Border Patrol 
responded by “return[ing] to aggressive migration control tactics” 
targeting unauthorized Mexicans.205 Not surprisingly, deportations 
skyrocketed.206 In 1976, for example, the INS deported 781,000 
Mexicans.207 That same year it deported fewer than 100,000 people 
from the rest of the world combined.208 The imposition of quotas on 
Western Hemisphere immigration and per-country ceilings fanned 
unauthorized Mexican immigration like nothing else in the history of 
the two nations and “recast Mexican migration as ‘illegal.’”209 
Without question, the Hart-Celler Act had the effect of 
diversifying the racial composition of new immigration as the last 
quarter of the twentieth century began.210 But that diversity was not 
without significant complication.211 The Act ignored social and 
 
 201. See NGAI, supra note 173, at 261. 
 202. See id. 
 203. See MOTOMURA, supra note 12, at 135; SCHNEIDER, supra note 199, at 239. 
 204. Douglas S. Massey, Epilogue to The Past and Future of Mexico-U.S. Migration, in 
BEYOND LA FRONTERA: THE HISTORY OF MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION 251, 254 (Mark 
Overmyer-Velázquez ed., 2011). 
 205. HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRA!, supra note 200, at 215. 
 206. See id. at 216. 
 207. NGAI, supra note 173, at 261. 
 208. See id. 
 209. See id. 
 210. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 199, at 243. 
 211. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON & BERNARD TRUJILLO, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE US-
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economic realities that drive immigration. It made no allowance for 
the unique relationship between the United States and México—the 
historical reliance on low-skill Mexican labor by numerous industries 
in the United States, a pattern of formal governmental and 
nongovernmental recruitment of Mexican workers, geographic 
proximity, personal relationships that spread across borders, and the 
ease with which generations of Mexicans had moved from one 
country to the other. Yet none of these factors changed when the 
lawful means of migration was suddenly capped by the 1965 Act and 
its 1976 amendments.212 
By framing its formal equality regarding the number of people 
from a given country who could lawfully immigrate each year as a 
gesture of fairness, immigration law pinned the onus of unauthorized 
immigration on the migrants themselves.213 Rather than query the 
underlying motivation for Mexican immigration or the willingness to 
do so in contravention of United States immigration law, Mexican 
migrants could be blamed for causing unauthorized immigration.214 
In this way, unauthorized immigration became framed as a moral 
issue and unauthorized immigrants as moral scofflaws.215 When 
policymakers became willing to turn to the criminal justice system to 
deal with all manner of perceived moral failings, as the next section 
explains, immigrants were caught up in this frenzy. 
 
MEXICO BORDER: ¿SÍ SE PUEDE? 125 (2011) (explaining that the 1965 Act “coupled more 
generous treatment of those outside the Western Hemisphere with less generous treatment of 
Latin Americans”). 
 212. NGAI, supra note 173, at 257 (noting that the 1965 Act curtailed legal avenues for 
Mexican immigration without addressing factors motivating Mexicans to come to the United 
States to work). 
 213. See id. at 246–48. 
 214. See David Fitzgerald, Mexican Migration and the Law, in BEYOND LA FRONTERA: 
THE HISTORY OF MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION, supra note 204, at 179, 192 (“Building on the 
legal fact that Mexicans are disproportionately represented among the unauthorized 
population, restrictionist politicians have been effective in discursively presenting illegal 
immigration as a ‘Mexican’ problem.”). 
 215. See Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the 
New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 615 (2003) [hereinafter Miller, Citizenship] (“The 
American Public now represents the primary victim of flawed immigration practices; a victim in 
need of protection from immigrants draining welfare coffers and failing to culturally assimilate 
into the white middle-class.”). 
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B. Crime as a Marker of Undesirability 
Civil rights era legislative successes did not assure the end of 
deeply ingrained racial biases that dominated the United States’ 
history. Instead, individuals who in the past had openly championed 
explicitly racialized methods of subjugating people of color set their 
sights on discrimination packaged in a race-neutral veneer.216 They 
found their answer in crime.217 A “law and order” discourse that had 
existed in limited fashion prior to the demise of Jim Crow quickly 
gained ground as the new paradigm of choice for governing social 
relations.218 
Understanding the cultural salience of crime that developed after 
the civil rights era219 requires grappling with its political utility. To 
be sure, reported crime rates did increase in the years following the 
1960s.220 This upswing can partly be explained by the fact that the 
baby boom generation reached the prime crime-committing years at 
this time.221 Millions of young men suddenly had the physical 
maturity and mental wherewithal to engage in antisocial behavior, 
including criminal activity.222 Crime rates did not, however, drive the 
newfound fear of crime. Rather, crime became more salient because 
it was more frequently pegged as the cause of social disarray. In her 
study of the war on drugs, Katherine Beckett concludes that “the 
extent to which political elites highlight the crime and drug 
problems is closely linked to subsequent levels of public concern 
about them and thus suggest that political initiative played a crucial 
 
 216. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 40, 42 (2010). 
 217. See Ian Haney López, Post-Racial Racialism: Racial Stratification and Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1033–34 (2010) (noting that 
“[t]he contest pitting law and order against civil rights” became increasingly tilted toward 
anticrime legislation after 1965). 
 218. See ALEXANDER, supra note 216, at 40. 
 219. See DAVID J. GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER 
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 10 (2001) (“Since the 1970s fear of crime has come to have new 
salience.”). 
 220. See id. at 153; JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR 
ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 24 
(2007) [hereinafter SIMON, GOVERNING]. 
 221. STUNTZ, supra note 136, at 20. 
 222. See MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 50–51 (1999). 
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role in generating public concern about crime and drugs.”223 Indeed, 
in public opinion polls, United States residents did not show any 
growing concern for drug activity until politicians, led by President 
Reagan’s decision to focus so much of his domestic policy on drugs, 
began framing it as a public-safety threat.224 
Added to this heightened awareness of crime was a belief that the 
new criminals were of a different variety than past lawbreakers. 
Unlike before, the criminals driving this new appreciation of crime 
were thought to be “incorrigible” repeat offenders, “young minority 
males, caught up in the underclass world of crime, drugs, broken 
families, and welfare dependency.”225 These were not individuals 
who could be rehabilitated. They were portrayed as lost souls— 
“desperate, driven, and capable of mindless violence,” as David 
Garland describes the rhetoric of the period226—prowling for the 
moment at which they could pounce on an unsuspecting, innocent 
victim. And they would do so time and time again unless stopped.227 
In response, the “broken windows theory” of criminal policing 
caught the attention of influential law enforcement officials and 
policymakers.228 Crystallized in a short 1982 magazine article by 
James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, the theory posited that 
criminality built upon itself one minor incident at a time.229 As 
Wilson and Kelling memorably explained using a visual that 
encapsulates the theory’s name, “if a window in a building is broken 
and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be 
 
 223. KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICAN POLITICS 23 (1997). 
 224. See id. at 55, 62. 
 225. See GARLAND, supra note 219, at 10, 136. 
 226. Id. at 154. 
 227. See id. at 180–81 (“The assumption today is that there is no such thing as an ‘ex-
offender’—only offenders who have been caught before and will strike again.”). 
 228. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence 
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New 
York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 302 (1998) (noting that New York City Mayor Rudolph 
Giuliani and Police Commissioner William Bratton credited the broken windows theory as the 
basis for their crime-fighting tactics). 
 229. See generally George J. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29; see also Harcourt, supra note 
228 (“The hypothesis of the broken windows theory is that minor disorder in a neighborhood, 
if left unchecked, will result in increased serious crime, and, therefore, that eliminating minor 
disorder will have a deterrent effect on major crime.”). 
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broken.”230 The best governmental strategy to prevent this chaotic 
escalation, they proposed, was “order-maintenance” policing—that 
is, police initiatives that identify and remove social deviants of all 
types from the streets, including people engaged in the most trivial 
of crime.231 “Who in their right mind, after all, would side with 
people who urinate in the street, break windows, aggressively accost 
passers-by, or vandalize other people’s property?,” asked Bernard 
Harcourt in his critical explanation of the intuitive rationale that 
made order-maintenance policing so captivating.232 By targeting low-
level offenders, order-maintenance policing proponents suggested 
that people who are inclined to commit crime are dissuaded by the 
realization that other community members care and the government 
is ready to punish them, while also making the law-abiding 
community members feel safer.233 
This anticrime rhetoric was ostensibly apolitical. Its purveyors did 
not repeat past claims that people of color were inferior because of 
identity characteristics or conduct necessarily tied to their race.234 
Rather, the new law and order proponents “developed instead the 
racially sanitized rhetoric of ‘cracking down on crime.’”235 
Importantly, like the formal equality that the Hart-Celler Act 
introduced into immigration law in 1965, criminal laws seem equally 
applicable to everyone.236 The elements of an offense do not favor 
one person over another.237 To violate the law, therefore, becomes 
framed as a decision; one that reveals a moral failing that ought to be 
sanctioned.238 
 
 230. Kelling & Wilson, supra note 229. 
 231. Harcourt, supra note 228, at 301. 
 232. Id. at 298. 
 233. Id. at 353. 
 234. See ALEXANDER, supra note 216, at 42. 
 235. See id.; Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the 
Conservative “Backlash”, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1555–56 (2003). 
 236. See MOTOMURA, supra note 12, at 132 (describing the 1965 immigration 
amendments as “apparently race-neutral”); Paul Butler, One Hundred Years of Race and 
Crime, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1043, 1055 (2010) (“[M]ost criminal statutes have 
been facially race-neutral for generations.”). 
 237. See Butler, supra note 236. 
 238. See GARLAND, supra note 219, at 185 (explaining that the criminological trends that 
gained hold in the 1980s “adopt[ed] an absolutist, moralizing approach to crime, and 
insist[ed] that criminal actions are voluntary, the bad choices of wicked individuals”); López, 
supra note 217, at 1034 (“[T]he language of lawbreaking relied on and promoted a social 
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But nothing is so simple. The shift from race-based 
marginalization to an emphasis on crime masked racialized values 
that were closely related to those previously expressed openly. The 
rhetoric concerned with criminality “allowed for the indirect 
expression of racially charged fears and antagonisms” by pointing to 
the same people as the explicitly racist language of decades past had 
done, only now it described them as lawbreakers.239 Indeed, 
prominent conservative politicians and activists in the 1960s 
famously wooed southern white voters by tapping their “racial fears 
and antagonisms,” launching what would come to be known as the 
“southern strategy.”240 After bearing the brunt of centuries of 
explicitly racist laws and practices, blacks in particular were again 
viewed as social outcasts—only now because of their supposed 
criminality.241 At the same time, middle-class white suburbanites 
became idealized as victims—or, at least, potential victims—of 
crime.242 Indeed, “[d]espite the fact that blacks are far more likely to 
be victims of crime . . . the majority of Americans believe that most 
criminals are black and most victims are white.”243 
Meanwhile, fear of crime took on its own political significance.244 
Apart from the desire to prevent or avoid crime itself, policymakers 
and the public viewed the threat of crime as a legitimate target.245 
Law enforcement agencies fashioned strategies “that took the 
reduction of fear as a distinct, self-standing policy goal.”246 They 
promoted neighborhood watch programs, for example, that were 
known to make people feel safer more than they actually made 
people safer by reducing crime.247 But, in this new penology, mental 
 
vision of individual failure rooted in moral depravity.”). 
 239. See BECKETT, supra note 223, at 42. 
 240. See id. at 41; López, supra note 217, at 1032. 
 241. See BECKETT, supra note 223, at 38 (explaining that after Richard Nixon and 
George Wallace trumpeted a concern about crime during the 1968 presidential campaign, 
public opinion polls indicated that a substantial majority of people polled “believed that law 
and order had broken down, and the majority blamed ‘Negroes who start riots’ and 
‘communists’ for this state of affairs”). 
 242. See SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 76. 
 243. BECKETT, supra note 223, at 84. 
 244. López, supra note 217, at 1037. 
 245. See GARLAND, supra note 219, at 10. 
 246. Id. at 122. 
 247. See id. 
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insecurity caused by the fear of crime was as much a threat as 
physical insecurity caused by the actual perpetration of crime. 
C. Policing Severity 
Accordingly, policymakers quickly searched for strategies to 
tackle crime and the possibility that it might occur. They found their 
answer in a panoply of measures that funneled more people into the 
criminal justice system and limited the off-ramps on the road to 
imprisonment. The most palpable of these measures were the 
practices that shifted the locus of discretion from judges to 
prosecutors, the militaristic law enforcement methods that became 
common among police departments, and the expanded use of 
imprisonment. 
The criminal justice system is filled with instances in which 
individual actors meaningfully exercise discretion. For much of the 
nation’s history until the 1970s, however, important aspects of that 
discretion rested in the hands of judges. As late as 1970, the standard 
sentencing practice placed significant power in judges to impose a 
punishment they deemed appropriate to the offense.248 Such 
“indeterminate sentencing” regimes placed enormous responsibility 
on judges that suggested a deep commitment to the notion that 
judges, as formally neutral actors in the criminal justice system, were 
well-positioned to assess the severity of a convicted individual’s 
conduct and devise a fitting sanction.249 
The criminal justice landscape, however, did not remain the 
same. The “war on crime” was well underway by the early 1970s and 
the “war on drugs” burst onto the political scene as well as the 
criminal justice system in the 1980s.250 With their stark rhetoric 
 
 248. See id. at 60. In Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s words, indeterminate sentencing 
schemes afforded judges “virtually unfettered discretion to sentence defendants to prison terms 
falling anywhere within the statutory range.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 315 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). Parole boards also received considerable discretion in situations 
involving individuals sentenced to imprisonment. Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: 
Rationality and Release Decisions by Parole Boards, 45 S.C. L. REV. 567, 573 (1994). 
 249. See Gilles R. Bissonnette, Comment, “Consulting” the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
After Booker, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1502 (2006) (explaining that the federal indeterminate 
sentencing “system gave federal judges wide discretion by allowing them to determine ‘the 
goals of sentencing, the factors to be considered, and how much weight to accord [certain] 
factors, as well as the ultimate punishment’”) (citation omitted). 
 250. See James Vorenberg, The War on Crime: The First Five Years, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 
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harkening to images of enemies and selfless warriors, the “wars” 
pitted the law-abiding public against the criminals. As James 
Vorenberg, an influential voice in criminal justice reforms in the late 
1960s, explained in a 1972 essay, “self-protection has become the 
dominant concern of those in our cities and suburbs.”251 Clearly, the 
battle lines were drawn. 
In this arrangement of forces there was no room for neutrality.252 
The trust in neutral judges dissipated quite suddenly beginning in 
the 1970s.253 Rather than continue to confide in the neutral role that 
judges are supposed to occupy, over the next two decades 
policymakers began to portray judges as “betrayers of the common 
good.”254 As the hallmark of the judicial role, neutrality became the 
downfall of judicial discretion. Judges, it was commonly thought, 
failed to punish as severely as the circumstances called for.255 In 
doing so, they came to be viewed as unreliable partners in the wars 
being waged in defense of law abiders everywhere.256 Because the 
dominant trope of the period—the notion that the nation was 
engaged in a war against a dangerous underclass—left no room for 
ambiguity about which side anyone was on, judges’ perceived failure 
to vigorously fight crime meant they became associated with the 
criminals rather than the victims. As Jonathan Simon explained, “the 
judge remains a figure of suspicion, a person with a propensity to 
violate public safety, little different in public confidence from the 
figure of the criminal before them.”257 
 
 
(May 1972), www.theatlantic.com/past/politics/crime/crimewar.htm (reviewing the 
successes and failures, as he saw them, of the first five years of the war on crime). 
 251. Id. Vorenberg served as executive director of a commission appointed by President 
Johnson to study crime in the United States. See William Glaberson, James Vorenberg, 
Watergate Prosecutor’s Right-Hand Man, Dies at 72, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2000, at C21. 
 252. See SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 112. 
 253. See id. at 102 (noting that states began to limit judicial discretion in the 1970s); id. 
at 128 (noting that the legislators in the 1980s viewed federal judges with “deep suspicion”). 
 254. See id. at 113. 
 255. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 7 (2007); SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 113–14. 
 256. See SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 116. Simon notes that judges were 
attacked for three reasons: Supreme Court opinions restricting arrests, interrogations, and 
searches, judicial abolishment of the death penalty, and judges’ use of discretion in sentencing. 
Id. at 114. 
 257. See id. at 129–30. 
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In response, legislators at the state and national level turned to 
sentencing schemes that removed discretion from judges’ hands. 
Congress, for example, enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
that established the United States Sentencing Commission.258 The 
Commission, in turn, issued sentencing guidelines that for more 
than two decades were binding on federal judges.259 Meanwhile, 
Congress and state legislators enacted an array of “mandatory 
[minimum] sentences that did not allow for the individualization of 
sentences but required the imposition of a specific prison sentence 
following the commission of a specific offense, generally a drug or 
weapons crime.”260 Eventually, Congress provided financial 
incentives for states to enact “truth in sentencing” laws that required 
convicted individuals to serve at least eighty-five percent of their 
sentence, rather than being let out early on parole.261 The idea was 
to promote greater sentencing uniformity while also reducing the 
likelihood that judges would issue sentences deemed too lenient or 
that parole boards would release convicted individuals.262 
Though judges came to be viewed as undeserving of the 
discretion they had long been assigned as part of criminal 
proceedings, discretion did not end. It remained a core feature of the 
criminal justice system.263 Rather than remain concentrated in 
judges, however, discretion was increasingly granted to 
 
 258. See DAVIS, supra note 255, at 103. 
 259. See id. at 103–04; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 249–50 (2005) 
(holding that the Sentencing Guidelines were not binding on federal judges). Justice Stephen 
Breyer, then Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, wrote that the 
Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated in order to promote “honesty in sentencing” and 
“reduce unjustifiably wide sentencing disparity.” Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 260. Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement 
Tools in the “War” on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1090–91 (2002). 
 261. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 
§§ 20101(b), 20102(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 1815; see PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES 
WILSON, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 3 (1999), available 
at http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf. 
 262. See SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 141 (“In varying degrees, virtually all 
the states in the United States have reoriented their penal systems toward more uniform 
application of prison sentences.”); id. at 102 (“A number of states abolished parole and 
introduced legislatively determined sentencing ranges that limited the discretion of judges. The 
federal system followed in 1987.”). 
 263. See DAVIS, supra note 255, at 6. 
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prosecutors.264 As decidedly biased actors in the criminal process, 
prosecutors were viewed as counterweights to criminals and the 
judges who had come to be cast as their allies.265 The sentencing 
reforms that took hold in the 1970s and 1980s, imposing mandatory 
minimums and truth-in-sentencing, meant that prosecutors wielded 
much more influence over outcomes in choosing the charges to 
bring.266 Now they could use the threat of significant prison time as 
leverage against defendants.267 That is, prosecutors could increase the 
likelihood that a defendant would see the inside of a prison for some 
amount of time simply by threatening a prosecution for one or more 
offenses that promised more imprisonment.268 In effect, prosecutors 
became the “clearly dominant force” in late twentieth century 
governmental responses to crime.269 
Added to these changes in the roles of judges and prosecutors 
were new developments in policing norms. Law enforcement 
agencies across the country turned to severe, paramilitary policing 
practices.270 Military-style patrols became commonplace.271 Police 
 
 264. See id. at 56; SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 43. 
 265. See SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 130; see also STUNTZ, supra note 136, 
at 88 (explaining that the introduction of government salaries and elections into the selection 
of prosecutors turned them into judgmental actors subject to political pressures). 
 266. See SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 102. 
 267. See DAVIS, supra note 255, at 57–58. William Stuntz explains how severe federal 
sentences affect state prosecutions: “Defendants agree to harsher sentences in state court for 
fear of what might happen to them in federal court. Federal law acts as an unfunded mandate, 
raising state sentencing levels without paying for the increase.” STUNTZ, supra note 136, at 306. 
 268. See DAVIS, supra note 255, at 105; see also JOHN F. PFAFF, THE CAUSES OF 
GROWTH IN PRISON ADMISSIONS AND POPULATIONS 7 (2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884674 (“[C]hanging decisions in prosecutors’ offices about 
when to file charges appear to be the primary—at times, seemingly almost the sole—driver of 
prison growth, at least since the mid-to late-1980s.”). Angela J. Davis explains that prosecutors 
frequently overcharge defendants—that is, they “‘tack[] on’ additional charges that they know 
they cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt or that they can technically prove but are 
inconsistent with the legislative intent or otherwise inappropriate.” DAVIS, supra note 255, at 
31. They do this, she adds, because it provides them an advantage during plea negotiations and 
presents a back-up offense in the event the principal charge does not result in a conviction. Id. 
 269. SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 41–42. 
 270. See GARLAND, supra note 219, at 177 (noting that law enforcement agencies 
incorporated technology that was advanced for the period, adopted widespread use of 
automobiles and communications equipment, and embraced “more reactive styles of ‘911’ 
policing”). 
 271. See Karan R. Singh, Note, Treading the Thin Blue Line: Military Special-Operations 
Trained Police SWAT Teams and the Constitution, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 673, 675–81 
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officers shifted their attention away from developing close 
relationships with community members to becoming an omnipresent 
but arms-length presence, especially in neighborhoods filled with 
poor people and people of color.272 Meanwhile, prisons met the goal 
of flexing the government’s power and reassuring the public that the 
threat of criminal victimization was being attacked at its roots: by 
segregating the perpetrators.273 Moreover, the prisons deal with 
wrongdoers the only way that is rational to deal with people who 
cannot be reformed—incapacitation. Prison walls are easily 
perceptible and prison population counts an easily reportable 
statistic. And in the years since the 1970s there has been no shortage 
of eye-catching statistics to report about the number of people 
removed from the streets.274 For some fifty years prior to 1973, there 
were approximately 110 state and federal prisoners per 100,000 
residents.275 Growing at a rate of about 6.3% annually, by 1997 that 
number had jumped to 445 per 100,000 residents.276 This has been 
especially true of incarceration related to drug offenses. Between 
1980 and 1996, the incarceration rate for drug crimes went from 
fewer than fifteen inmates per 100,000 adults in the nation’s 
population to 148 inmates per 100,000.277 There were more people 
in prison for drug crimes in 1996 per 100,000 people, therefore, 
than there were for all crimes in the half-century prior to 1973.278 
 
(2001) (describing the creation of special weapons and tactics (SWAT) and similar units in 
police departments in the late 1960s and 1970s); Amanda M. Yeaples-Coleman, Comment, 
Reviving the Knock and Announce Rule and Constructively Abolishing No-Knock Entries by 
Giving the People a Ground They Can Stand On, 37 U. DAYTON L. REV. 381, 388 (2012) 
(explaining that there was a 538% increase in the use of SWAT teams between 1980 and 
1995). 
 272. See GARLAND, supra note 219, at 114. 
 273. See SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 157 (explaining that prisons are 
intended to assuage the public’s feelings of insecurity). Importantly, changes in the 
imprisonment rate are not closely related to changes in crime rates. David Jacobs & Aubrey L. 
Jackson, On the Politics of Imprisonments: A Review of Systematic Findings, 6 ANN. REV. SOC. 
SCI. 129, 131 (2010). 
 274. For an eye-catching graphical display of incarceration rates from 1920 to 1997, see 
Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980–1996, 26 CRIME & 
JUST. 17, 19 fig.1 (1999). 
 275. See id. at 17–18. 
 276. See id. at 18. 
 277. See id. at 21 & fig.2. 
 278. See id. at 21. 
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This evolution in policing norms affected communities of color 
most poignantly. For one thing, community relations with police 
officers all but collapsed in many urban areas. Black victims of crime 
struggled to receive police assistance while black residents were 
frequently, almost reflexively, perceived as perpetrators of crime.279 
Moreover, imprisonment rates skyrocketed, especially among young 
black men convicted of drug crimes.280 By 1996 more than eight 
percent of black men in their late twenties were in prison.281 There is 
now a greater likelihood that young black men will spend time in a 
jail or prison than at any other time in United States history.282 As 
Michelle Alexander has carefully documented, incarceration has 
effectively removed massive numbers of black men from community 
life in much the same way that Jim Crow did prior to the civil rights 
movement.283 Imprisonment essentially became a rite of passage for 
many young black men.284 
Latinos also felt the brunt of imprisonment policy. Indeed, 
between 1980 and 1996 there was a 554% growth in the number of 
Latinos in a state or federal prison who were sentenced to a year or 
more.285 Putting this another way, the number of Latino prisoners 
per 100,000 United States residents in 1980 was 206; in 1996, that 
number hit 690.286 
In sum, the 1960s through the 1990s witnessed sea changes in 
acceptable modes of discourse and significant changes in the 
substantive law regulating immigration and crime. Instead of 
employing overtly racist means of subjugating entire classes of 
nonwhite people, policymakers embraced the formal equality of 
 
 279. See STUNTZ, supra note 136, at 22 (noting that “[c]rime victims in black 
neighborhoods have difficulty convincing local police to take their victimization seriously”). 
 280. See MAUER, supra note 222, at 143–44 & 153 tbl.8-1; see also Blumstein & Beck, 
supra note 274, at 22 (noting that “[t]he growth in incarceration has been greater for women 
and minorities than for men and whites” between 1980 and 1996, but that female prisoners 
only comprised 6.1% of the prison population in 1996). Mauer reports that the arrest rate for 
black men suspected of drug activity also increased significantly. MAUER, supra note 222, at 
146 fig.8-2. 
 281. See Blumstein & Beck, supra note 274, at 23. 
 282. ANGELA J. HATTERY & EARL SMITH, AFRICAN AMERICAN FAMILIES 240 (2007). 
 283. See ALEXANDER, supra note 216, at 2–4. 
 284. See STUNTZ, supra note 136, at 34. 
 285. See Blumstein & Beck, supra note 274, at 22 tbl.1. 
 286. See id. 
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crime control as a depoliticized marker of undesirability. It was only 
a matter of time, as Part IV explains, before these trends would 
create crimmigration law. 
IV. CRIMMIGRATION IS MADE 
The moment in which events converged to produce 
crimmigration came in the 1980s and 1990s. Much of Latin America 
was unstable—México’s economy had plummeted, Central America 
was being ravaged by civil wars, the Caribbean continued to suffer 
immense poverty, and South America’s booming export to the 
United States was of the illicit variety, cocaine. Since the civil rights 
movement had rendered it culturally and politically infeasible to 
enact blatantly racist immigration policies similar to those adopted in 
past generations, policymakers sought a different method of 
regulating immigrants. The new willingness to punish that was 
sweeping criminal law and procedure soon reached immigration law. 
Instead of adopting explicitly race-based considerations to keep out 
entire racial groups as was frequently done prior to the civil rights 
movement, Congress and multiple presidential administrations 
enacted increasingly strict immigration laws that emphasized a 
noncitizen’s involvement in criminal activity. Investigations of 
potential immigration law violations began to resemble criminal 
policing operations, and decisions about who to admit into or deport 
from the United States more and more often turned on criminal 
histories. Despite the facial neutrality of these enactments, however, 
the people most adversely affected were nonwhite newcomers just as 
was often the case prior to the civil rights era. In the post-civil rights 
period, crime effectively became a proxy for race. 
A. Rekindling the Fear of Immigrants 
A series of high profile and politically fraught events sparked a 
newfound concern about foreigners in the 1980s. Caribbean and 
Central American migrants were streaming into the United States 
without permission, and the federal government, it seemed, had no 
way of keeping up.287 It was simply outmatched. Upwards of 
 
 287. See Jonathan Simon, Refugees in a Carceral Age: The Rebirth of Immigration Prisons 
in the United States, 10 PUB. CULTURE 577, 579, 582–83 (1998); [hereinafter Simon, 
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125,000 Cubans who left the island’s port of Mariel in 1979 and 
1980 reached Miami’s coast.288 Another 15,000 or so Haitians 
braved Caribbean waters to arrive in the United States.289 Neither 
group was welcomed. The Cubans—pejoratively described as 
“marielitos”—were depicted as common criminals, with U.S. News 
& World Report going so far as to publish a special report titled 
“Castro’s ‘Crime Bomb’ Inside U.S.”290 Haitians, meanwhile, were 
associated with crime, in particular drug activity, and at times 
described as coming to take advantage of United States social welfare 
largess.291 During this same time, along the land border with 
México, Central Americans made their way into the United States 
clandestinely.292 
By the early 1980s the number of unauthorized immigrants 
living in the United States had caught the attention of federal 
policymakers and they began formulating potential legislative 
responses. In 1980, for example, Ronald Reagan, then a presidential 
candidate, rejected the idea of building a wall between México and 
 
Refugees]; see also TIMOTHY J. DUNN, THE MILITARIZATION OF THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER, 
1978–1992: LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT DOCTRINE COMES HOME 160 (1996) [hereinafter 
DUNN, MILITARIZATION] (discussing the Reagan Administration’s punitive reaction to 
Central American migrants); Stephanie J. Silverman, Immigration Detention in America: A 
History of its Expansion and a Study of its Significance 9 (Univ. of Oxford, Working Paper No. 
80, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1867366 (discussing a “panic among the 
American public” caused by Cuban migration in the early 1980s). 
 288. JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER AND BEYOND: THE WAR ON 
“ILLEGALS,” AND THE REMAKING OF THE U.S.-MEXICO BOUNDARY 82–83 (2d ed. 2010). 
 289. See Simon, Refugees, supra note 287, at 579. 
 290. John S. Lang, Castro’s “Crime Bomb” Inside U.S., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 
16, 1984, at 27, 27; see JORGE DUANY, BLURRED BORDERS: TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION 
BETWEEN THE HISPANIC CARIBBEAN AND THE UNITED STATES 45, 140 (2011). According to 
Duany, “[c]ontrary to media reports, less than 2 percent of the Marielitos were common 
criminals, though 25 percent had been imprisoned for various reasons, including ideological 
differences with the Cuban government and ‘antisocial’ behavior such as public displays of 
homosexuality.” Id. 
 291. See Simon, Refugees, supra note 287, at 593; Teresa A. Miller, The Impact of Mass 
Incarceration on Immigration Policy, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 214, 226, 232 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-
Lind eds., 2002) [hereinafter Miller, Impact]. 
 292. See Nora Hamilton & Norma Stoltz Chincilla, Central American Migration: A 
Framework for Analysis, in NEW AMERICAN DESTINIES: A READER IN CONTEMPORARY ASIAN 
AND LATINO IMMIGRATION 91, 109–10 (Darrell Y. Hamamoto & Rodolfo D. Torres eds., 
1997); see also DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 46, 160 (describing the U.S. 
government’s treatment of Central Americans in the early 1980s). 
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the United States.293 His opponent for the Republican presidential 
nomination, the future president George H.W. Bush, acknowledged 
“the illegal alien problem” before taking a position that, much like 
Reagan’s, seems quaint to contemporary ears—“the problem,” he 
claimed, “is we are making illegal the labor that I’d like to see 
legal.”294 Four years later, in a debate against Democratic opponent 
Walter Mondale, President Reagan expressed his belief that “our 
borders are out of control” and his support for “an immigration bill 
that will give us, once again, control of our borders.”295 Clearly the 
pressure was on policymakers to do something about what had come 
to be seen as an urgent problem.296 Within two years, Congress 
would do just that, sending President Reagan a wide-ranging 
immigration bill that he signed into law. 
As had occurred many times before, numerous policy initiatives 
implemented as early as 1980 took a decisively derisive position 
toward foreigners. Instead of simply identifying people to exclude or 
deport based on racial categorizations, this time immigration law 
turned on a noncitizen’s involvement in the nation’s alarm du jour: 
crime, specifically drug-related activity. Haitians were quickly 
racialized as African-American meaning that the concerns policy 
makers had with drug activity in black communities was easily 
imputed onto these new arrivals.297 Much the same happened with 
the Cubans who left the island from the port of Mariel.298 Unlike 
earlier Cuban emigrants, roughly half of the Mariel Cubans were 
black and many were low-skilled laborers.299 After “INS officials . . . 
began to notice Cuban men who were ‘more hardened and rougher 
 
 293. Robert Guest, Foreword to PILAR MARRERO, KILLING THE AMERICAN DREAM: 
HOW ANTI-IMMIGRATION EXTREMISTS ARE DESTROYING THE NATION, at xii–xiii (2012). 
 294. PILAR MARRERO, KILLING THE AMERICAN DREAM: HOW ANTI-IMMIGRATION 
EXTREMISTS ARE DESTROYING THE NATION 14–15 (2012). 
 295. 1984—Ronald Reagan on Amnesty, YOUTUBE.COM, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=JfHKIq5z80U (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). 
 296. See Oscar J. Martinez, Migration and the Border, 1965–1985, in BEYOND LA 
FRONTERA: THE HISTORY OF MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION, supra note 204, at 103, 111. 
William Colby, who led the Central Intelligence Agency in the 1970s, claimed that 
unauthorized Mexican immigrants posed a greater danger to the United States than the Soviet 
Union. NEVINS, supra note 288, at 79. 
 297. Miller, Impact, supra note 291, at 232; see Simon, Refugees, supra note 287 at 593–94. 
 298. See Silverman, supra note 287, at 9. 
 299. See MARK S. HAMM, THE ABANDONED ONES: THE IMPRISONMENT AND UPRISING 
OF THE MARIEL BOAT PEOPLE 75 (1995). Interestingly, Duany reports that only twenty 
percent or so self-identified as black. Duany, supra note 290, at 45. 
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in appearance’ than earlier arrivals . . . the INS concluded that the 
Cuban government was taking advantage of the immigration accords 
[signed by the United States and Cuba] by emptying the nation’s 
prison system of hard-core criminals.”300 The White House agreed 
with the INS’s assessment and soon news reports appeared repeating 
these claims.301 It eventually would become clear that these claims 
were exaggerated, but by then “marielito” had become synonymous 
with dangerousness. 302 
Additionally, though cross-border smuggling has been part of 
border life in the Southwest as long as it has constituted an 
international boundary,303 the newfound concern about drug 
trafficking brought law enforcement attention to the southern 
border not seen since the days when a German invasion was thought 
possible. The Soviet-aligned Sandinistas, President Reagan 
commented in a reference to the putatively socialist government of 
Nicaragua, are only a two-day’s drive from Texas.304 Meanwhile, 
drugs that had previously been routed through the Caribbean began 
making their way into the United States across the Mexican 
border.305 The México-United States border had become, as one 
Border Patrol officer put it, “a ‘danger zone . . . a war zone, if you 
will.’”306 Clandestine entrants and drug traffickers became 
indistinguishable,307 and both were “enemies” of a sort.308 Some 
policymakers described unauthorized immigration as an 
“invasion.”309 This narrative claimed that the border was “out of 
control” and “migrant workers from Mexico became increasingly 
associated with drug trafficking.”310 For the Reagan Administration, 
clandestine immigration and cross-border drug trafficking dovetailed 
 
 300. HAMM, supra note 299, at 51. 
 301. See id. at 51–52. 
 302. See id. at 58, 76. 
 303. TONY PAYAN, THE THREE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER WARS: DRUGS, IMMIGRATION, 
AND HOMELAND SECURITY 18 (2006). 
 304. DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 3; see Eleanor Clift, Lambastes “Liberals” 
as Helping to Create Deficits: Reagan Uses Tough Tone on Trail, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 1986. 
 305. PAYAN, supra note 303, at 12; see NEVINS, supra note 288. 
 306. DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 87; see PAYAN, supra note 303, at xii. 
 307. DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 87. 
 308. Id. at 162–63. 
 309. See NEVINS, supra note 288, at 79. 
 310. Id. at 97. 
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to make border security a national security issue.311 By 1990, drugs 
had become so intertwined with concerns about cross-border 
movement that President George H.W. Bush described the border as 
“the front lines of the war on drugs.”312 
Just as nonwhite foreigners had been deemed a menace prior to 
the civil rights movement, immigrants in the closing quarter of the 
twentieth century were viewed derisively. Only now the blatant racial 
animus of a prior era gave way to facially neutral concerns about 
immigrants’ role in criminal activity, especially related to drugs. 
Combined with the newfound but profound concern about drug 
activity, unauthorized immigration became a security issue.313 The 
“criminal alien,” it was thought, was a “dangerous class” present 
everywhere—always lurking in wait for an opportunity to wreak 
havoc on United States communities.314 It was easy, then, to attack 
immigrants as threatening individual residents of the United States 
and the nation as a whole.315 
B. Activating Penal Power 
The public policy response to immigration and cross-border drug 
trafficking was identical: flex the state’s penal power.316 “Policing 
became the new way of dealing with any issues along the border.”317 
The political rhetoric along with the law enforcement strategies, 
tactics, personnel, and financial and hardware resources that 
launched and sustained the war on drugs were reemployed along the 
 
 311. DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 42. 
 312. George H.W. Bush, Presidential Statement on Signing the Immigration Act of 1990 
(Nov. 29, 1990), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19117#axzz1OsUYZ1gw. 
 313. See Miller, Citizenship, supra note 215, at 625; see also Marc R. Rosenblum, 
Immigration and U.S. National Interests: Historical Cases and the Contemporary Debate, in 
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND SECURITY: U.S., EUROPEAN, AND COMMONWEALTH 
PERSPECTIVES 13, 14 (Terri E. Givens et al. eds., 2009) (“Thus, while most migratory flows 
are not threatening to security, migration control becomes a legitimate security concern when 
unwanted immigration overlaps with or reinforces other security threats.”). 
 314. See Miller, Citizenship, supra note 215, at 646. 
 315. Alex M. Saragoza, Cultural Representation and Mexican Immigration, in BEYOND 
LA FRONTERA: THE HISTORY OF MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION, supra note 198, at 227, 235–36 
(explaining that unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the 1980s were viewed as potential drug 
traffickers while also “trampl[ing] with impunity on the sovereignty of the United States”). 
 316. See DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 104 (“[I]mmigration and drug 
enforcement efforts often overlapped.”). 
 317. PAYAN, supra note 303, at 12. 
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border. This new emphasis on curtailing clandestine entry by people 
and drugs neatly matched trends in criminal policing.318 The goal 
was to “regain control” of cross-border traffic, and the government’s 
full array of resources was put into action.319 
 As in the criminal context, police and prosecutors occupied the 
first line of attack. Law enforcement agencies suddenly found 
themselves adding new types of border-related work to their 
portfolios. INS officers, for example, became involved in drug-
related enforcement activities in the mid-1980s, often alongside 
criminal law enforcement agencies.320 Importantly, the agency also 
had more money and officers to devote to its growing concerns—
between 1980 and 1988 the INS’s congressionally appropriated 
funding increased 130% and staff grew by 41%.321 One of its units, 
the Border Patrol, developed a host of antidrug initiatives to 
augment its traditional focus on clandestine immigration, including 
controversial patrols near El Paso public schools.322 Indeed, 
beginning in 1989, the INS claimed “that the Border Patrol had 
primary responsibility among federal agencies for drug interdiction 
between official ports of entry along the U.S.-México border.”323 
The agency soon obtained power to enforce federal drug laws.324 
Two years later, in 1991, this became the Bush Administration’s 
official policy.325 To adequately complete its drug-fighting mission, 
 
 318. See id. at xiv (describing border security policies as containing “all the elements of a 
war . . . the strategy, the tactics, the personnel, the resources, the rhetoric, and the hardware, 
etc.”); see also NEVINS, supra note 288, at 5 (describing Border Patrol expansions in the early 
and mid-1990s as war-like strategies). 
 319. See PAYAN, supra note 303, at 114. 
 320. See Criminal Aliens: INS Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Immigr., 
Refugees, and Int’l L., Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 28 (1987), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/145875.pdf. 
 321. NEVINS, supra note 288, at 84. 
 322. Id. at 85; see TIMOTHY J. DUNN, BLOCKADING THE BORDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
THE EL PASO OPERATION THAT REMADE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 28 (2009) 
[hereinafter Dunn, BLOCKADING]. 
 323. DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 80. 
 324. See Rebecca Bohrman & Naomi Murakawa, Remaking Big Government: 
Immigration and Crime Control in the United States, in GLOBAL LOCKDOWN: RACE, 
GENDER, AND THE PRISON-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 109, 116 (Julia Sudbury ed. 2005). 
 325. See Southwest Border Enforcement Affected by Mission Expansion and Budget, 
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Int’l L., Immig. & Refugees, H. Comm. of Judiciary, 102d 
Cong. 1 (1991) (statement of Harold A. Valentine, Associate Director, Administration of 
Justice Issues). 
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the INS provided the Border Patrol with funding for new stations 
and checkpoints.326 These initiatives and funding priorities expanded 
immigration officials’ focus to include anticrime policing in addition 
to violations of immigration law. Thus, their law enforcement 
concerns shifted. No longer tied to their historical concern about 
undesirable racial groups, they now sorted noncitizens on the basis 
of the facially neutral criminal label. 
At the same time, the military became involved in immigration 
regulation. Usually justified by a concern about keeping illicit drugs 
out of the country, the military quickly took a role in enforcing 
immigration law. The 1981 Military Cooperation with Law 
Enforcement Officials Act, for example, authorized military 
involvement in drug and immigration enforcement activities.327 
Separately, because Congress did not think the Border Patrol was up 
to the task on its own, it “forced the military to aid the Border Patrol 
in guarding the border” and soon provided approximately $1 billion 
in funding for border-related drug activities.328 With time the 
military wound up playing a significant role in assisting to identify 
and apprehend suspected clandestine entrants.329 A secret National 
Guard initiative launched in 1989, Operation Border Ranger II, for 
example, deployed armed troops to the border to assist civilian law 
enforcement agencies with drug and immigration enforcement 
efforts by, among other things, informing INS agents about the 
presence of suspected clandestine entrants.330 The next year, a 
Marine unit working alongside the Border Patrol in Texas and 
Arizona utilized then-novel surveillance from an unmanned aerial 
vehicle (a “drone”).331 This helped the Border Patrol double the 
number of clandestine entrants it usually identified, while also 
confiscating marijuana shipments.332 
 
 326. NEVINS, supra note 288, at 85. 
 327. Candidus Dougherty, While the Government Fiddled Around, the Big Easy Drowned: 
How the Posse Comitatus Act Became the Government’s Alibi for the Hurricane Katrina Disaster, 
29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 117, 131 (2008). This authority was expanded in 1988. DUNN, 
MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 117. 
 328. PAYAN, supra note 303, at 79. 
 329. See DUNN, BLOCKADING, supra note 322, at 181 (2009). 
 330. DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 128. 
 331. Id. at 132. 
 332. Id. 
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That same year, the military created Joint Task Force-6 (“JTF-
6”), an initiative intended to coordinate military support of civilian 
law enforcement agencies along the border as well as in Houston and 
Los Angeles, two large interior metropolitan areas with large 
immigrant communities.333 Involving at least 500 troops—including 
Army Rangers and Green Berets—JTF-6 primarily assisted Border 
Patrol agents with their drug-fighting duties.334 Importantly, though 
JTF-6 personnel were ostensibly deployed to support law 
enforcement officers and not to enforce laws themselves, they were 
nonetheless authorized to shoot to kill if military or civilian law 
enforcement personnel were endangered—a far cry from the long-
standing practice of prohibiting the military from engaging in 
domestic law enforcement practices.335 This power proved fateful in 
1997 when Marines participating in a JTF-6 operation shot and 
killed Ezekiel Hernández, Jr., an eighteen-year-old United States 
citizen who was tending his family’s livestock when the troops 
mistook him for a drug trafficker.336 Though JTF-6 was later 
disbanded, its successors continue to be deployed to the border 
ostensibly to assist with antidrug efforts while also engaging in 
immigration law enforcement. Joint Task Force-North, for example, 
“assisted in the apprehension of 3,865 undocumented aliens” in 
fiscal year 2010,337 while its manned aerial support program 
“[a]ssisted in the apprehension of 6,500-8,000 undocumented 
aliens” during fiscal year 2011.338 The military’s involvement in 
routine immigration law enforcement actions suggests the antidrug 
rationale is paperthin. It is instead a politically acceptable route by 
 
 333. See id. at 133–34. 
 334. See id. at 137. 
 335. Id.; see United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 925 (D.S.D. 1975) 
(holding that the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385, “makes unlawful the use of federal 
military troops in an active role of direct law enforcement by civil law enforcement officers”). 
 336. JUSTIN AKERS CHACÓN & MIKE DAVIS, NO ONE IS ILLEGAL: FIGHTING RACISM 
AND STATE VIOLENCE ON THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 208 (2006). 
 337. Memorandum from David M. D’Agostino, Dir., Def. Capabilities & Mgmt., U.S. 
Gov’t Accountability Office, to Senator Carl Levin, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed 
Servs., Observations on the Costs and Benefits of an Increased Department of Defense Role in 
Helping to Secure the Southwest Land Border 21 (Sept. 12, 2011). 
 338. Id. at 32. Two other recent Defense Department antidrug initiatives, Operation 
Jump Start and Operation Phalanx, also put military personnel in a position to assist with the 
apprehension of large numbers of unauthorized immigrants. See id. at 16–17. 
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which to justify heavy-handed securitization measures along the 
border in an era when it is not acceptable to do so on the basis of the 
racialized markers used in the past. 
The policing build-up meant that governmental agencies were 
apprehending more people suspected of being in the country 
without permission. To accommodate this, immigration officials 
adopted a tactic newly en vogue in criminal policing: drastically 
expanding the government’s detention capabilities. Prior to 1980, 
immigration detention was the exception.339 That twenty–five year 
norm suddenly changed within the span of a few years in the early 
1980s—all the time that the INS needed to ramp up its bed space. 
The agency built its own facilities and contracted with private 
corporations to boost its detention capacity from approximately 
1,720 beds in 1982 to roughly 7,439 in 1988, including 4,200 in 
private facilities.340 In the Lower Río Grande Valley of South Texas, 
the INS began to detain every asylum applicant, and prepared to run 
what it called a “federal reservation.”341 Detention was so 
commonplace in this region that one commentator described it as 
“virtually a ‘detention zone’ during much of the 1980s for Central 
Americans.”342 
In other parts of the country, Cubans and Haitians were 
subjected to similar treatment. The INS set up temporary detention 
facilities and rented space in a federal prison to house unauthorized 
Cubans,343 and in 1982 President Reagan ordered the mandatory 
detention of clandestinely arriving Haitians.344 A more permanent 
solution soon followed in the form of the Krome Avenue Detention 
Center, a facility that the INS quickly opened in Miami to house 
Cuban and Haitian noncitizens and that still exists solely to house 
immigration detainees.345 Though not described as a jail or prison, it 
 
 339. See DOW, supra note 51, at 7; Miller, Impact, supra note 291, at 214; Miller, 
Citizenship, supra note 215, at 611, 640. 
 340. See DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 47–48. 
 341. See id. at 91–92. 
 342. Id. at 75. 
 343. See Silverman, supra note 287, at 9. 
 344. Id. at 10. 
 345. SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 379; see Simon, Refugees, supra note 287, 
at 579; U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, MIAMI FIELD OFFICE, KROME 
SERVICE PROCESSING CENTER FACT SHEET, 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/facilities/pdf/kro.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). 
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had many features of these secure environments: fencing, armed 
guards, orange jumpsuits for inmates, and more.346 In the 1990s, 
Krome would gain notoriety as the site of guard-on-inmate abuse.347 
Within a few years, the immigration detention practice would 
shift from its early focus on Central American and Caribbean 
refugees, frequently perceived to be involved in criminal activity, to 
an explicit emphasis on people suspected of having engaged in 
criminal activity, often drug-related activity.348 The Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1986, for example, granted the INS the power to issue a 
“detainer to detain” any person arrested for having violated a 
controlled-substances offense.349 Its 1988 counterpart likewise 
turned the INS’s detention policy toward so-called “criminal aliens” 
by adding the “aggravated felony” basis of deportation to the INA, 
defining it narrowly to include only drug trafficking and two other 
crimes, murder and firearms trafficking, and requiring that the INS 
take into custody noncitizens convicted of an aggravated felony.350 
Immigration policy has not shifted from this focus since then. In 
fact, the emphasis on crime and the use of criminal policing tactics 
has only increased in the intervening years. Today’s norms arise from 
the practices implemented in the 1980s and early 1990s when the 
federal government unleashed its policing authority along the border 
to regulate the flow of people and illicit drugs. Immigration agents 
were tasked with stopping drug crimes, and the military was 
employed to identify and apprehend immigration law violators. 
Doing this set the stage for crimmigration law’s creation. 
 
 346. See Dow, supra note 51, at 56; MICHAEL WELCH, DETAINED: IMMIGRATION LAWS 
AND THE EXPANDING I.N.S. JAIL COMPLEX 116–17 (2002). 
 347. See DOW, supra note 51, at 56–57; WELCH, supra note 346, at 123. 
 348. See DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 72–73. 
 349. Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1751(d), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-47 
(1986) (amending INA § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357). For a more detailed discussion of 
immigration detainers, see Christopher Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s Authority 
to Issue Immigration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 183 (2008). 
 350. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7342, 7343, 102 Stat. 
4181, 4469-70 (1988) (amending INA § 101(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) and § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a) respectively). 
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C. Merging Criminal Law and Immigration Law 
The convergence of criminal and immigration law did not occur 
coincidentally or accidentally. Rather, it was a logical progression of 
deliberate choices. The state’s penal authority came to be seen in the 
1980s as the law-abiding public’s last hope to stem the tide of 
criminality taking the country by storm. 
Immigration law was not immune to these trends. The rise in 
unauthorized immigration that occurred during the last three 
decades of the twentieth century was represented rhetorically as a 
threat to the nation’s very existence. The argument held that the 
country’s sovereignty could mean little if the government and the 
public to which it responded did not know who was crossing its 
borders.351 Worse yet, unauthorized migrants arrived in a country 
struggling with the legacy of overt racism that in the post-civil rights 
era had nowhere to easily escape. Mostly racialized as nonwhite 
(Asian, black, and Latino), the new arrivals were saddled with the 
burden of domestic and international political tension. The Cubans 
were deemed criminals, the Haitians linked to African-American 
drug activity, the Central Americans depicted as the vanguard of a 
communist threat flouting the United States’ sovereignty and laws 
regulating cross-border movement, and the Mexicans as willing 
accomplices to Colombian drug trafficking. No matter the 
particulars, in an era when overt racism was no longer tolerated, all 
were deemed dangerous because of their association with illegal 
conduct and therefore unwanted. 
And as with the criminal justice system’s response to drug 
activity, the immigration law system responded with strong-armed 
policing and imprisonment strategies. Immigration in violation of 
the law, traditionally a civil infraction, increasingly came within the 
province of criminal justice system actors. Even minor criminal 
convictions of noncitizens that previously had no immigration 
consequence became likely to result in removal. Immigration 
policing agents broadened their investigative techniques to more 
closely resemble criminal law enforcement officers—including sting 
 
 351. See Rosenblum, supra note 313, at 14. 
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operations reminiscent of antidrug initiatives.352 They boosted their 
armaments and even joined forces with the military. Meanwhile, 
prisons simultaneously became the symbol of chaos and order. If 
they exist, the public discourse suggests, it is because a threat 
lurks.353 The government likewise uses the existence of prisons to 
demonstrate that it is doing something about that danger.354 In the 
immigration context of the 1980s and 1990s, the people inside the 
prison walls were framed as dangerous outsiders who did not deserve 
the nation’s hospitality; their presence, quite simply, was not 
desired.355 Keeping them locked up provided those who were outside 
with “a fake sense of security,” but a sense of security nonetheless.356 
The merger of criminal law and immigration law allowed for a 
unified front against the threat ostensibly facing the law-abiding 
public. Police agents of all variety were sent into the streets to watch, 
identify, and apprehend outlaws of multiple sorts—selling drugs, 
working without authorization, present without permission. Unlike 
before, when undesirability was explicitly determined by race, in the 
age of metaphorical wars against crime and drugs, undesirability 
became pegged to criminality. In turn, criminality became tied, 
implicitly, to race. Law enforcement agents were given the task of 
physically removing from the body politic unwanted elements.357 
Given the nation’s appreciation of confinement, law enforcement 
authorities were thought to be successful if the lawbreakers were in 
the prisons, excluded from the law-abiding community and under 
the government’s control.358 In the age of crimmigration, police 
authorities have done this with remarkable success, thereby providing 
 
 352. Miller, Citizenship, supra note 215, at 638. 
 353. See Stephanie J. Silverman, Return to the Isle of Man: The Implications of Internment 
for Understanding Immigration Detention in the UK 13 (Univ. of Oxford, Working Paper No. 
102, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2211336. 
 354. See Simon, Refugees, supra note 287, at 577, 603. 
 355. ALEXANDRA HALL, BORDER WATCH: CULTURES OF IMMIGRATION, DETENTION 
AND CONTROL 2, 7 (2012) (positing that this is what occurs in the United Kingdom). 
 356. Inés Valdez, Sovereignty and the City: Raiding, Detaining, and Domestic 
Immigration Policing 2 (W. Political Sci. Ass’n, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1580743. 
 357. See Bohrman & Murakawa, supra note 324, at 122–23. 
 358. See GARLAND, supra note 219, at 177 (noting that today prisons are “conceived 
much more explicitly as a mechanism of exclusion and control”). 
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the public with a sense of security.359 In the battle against danger and 
the fear of danger, the government, these tactics proclaim, finally has 
the upper hand. 
CONCLUSION 
Crimmigration is now a defining feature of law enforcement in 
the United States. To the tens of thousands of people who are 
prosecuted criminally because of an alleged immigration law 
violation (making this the largest category of offenses prosecuted in 
federal courts during several recent years), and to the hundreds of 
thousands who are imprisoned while immigration officials decide 
whether they will be allowed to remain in the country (making ICE 
the largest detention agency in the United States), criminal law is not 
distinct from immigration law. The two are simply different ends of a 
single punitive spectrum of governmental authority wielded over 
their lives. 
To understand why crimmigration law developed and where it 
might head, it is necessary to understand its origins. This Article 
charts that history. The cultural and legislative successes of the civil 
rights era made it culturally, politically, and legally unacceptable or 
impermissible to repeat the overt racism that dominated law and law 
enforcement for much of the nation’s history. Those successes, 
however, could not so easily preclude the widespread sentiment that 
people of color were undesirable, indeed, dangerous. Consequently, 
a punitive spirit took hold in the 1980s that continued the 
marginalization of people of color, but did so through operation of 
race-neutral criminal laws and practices. Immigration law soon 
developed a statutory scheme that categorized newcomers based on 
their interactions with the criminal justice system and borrowed 
criminal policing’s ever harsher punitive bent—interactions that, it 
unsurprisingly turned out, continued to weigh most heavily on 
people of color. 
 
 
 359. See ANNA O. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS 80 (2010) 
(“The apprehension numbers, exacerbated by arrest quotas, demonstrate to the public that the 
border enforcement strategies are working because the apprehension numbers represent illegal 
aliens that would have infiltrated our border defenses had the border patrol and INS not 
apprehended them.”). 
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